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I. INTRODUCTION
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) obligate parties to the Paris Convention and
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide minimum
standards of protection for trademarks, among other things.' For example,
members must protect distinctive trademarks against certain unauthorized uses
"in the course of trade" that "would result in a likelihood of confusion.' 2 Yet
many states also have obligations under their constitutions or human rights
treaties to protect the right to freedom of expression. 3 States shield speech
ranging from political discourse to entertainment and even commercial
advertising from government restriction because freedom of expression is
essential in a democratic society and a robust marketplace of ideas promotes
the discovery of truth.4 National trademark laws are govemment regulations
of speech that implicate the right to freedom of expression and are permissible
under constitutional or international law only if the speech is categorically
unprotected (like misleading commercial speech in the United States) or if the
government can justify this regulation of speech under applicable legal
standards.5
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as revised at Stockholm, July 14,
1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. For a discussion of the
international obligations to protect trademarks and other types of intellectual property set forth in these
agreements, see, for example, G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1968); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2007); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2008); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed.
2008) [hereinafter IP&IT]; and STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 59-278, 965-1322 (1975).
2. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
3. See infra Subsection III.B.3 and note 30.
4. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005);
ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2d ed. 2007); ROBERT J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM
OF SPEECH (2006); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
5. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L.
REV. 381 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of U.S. federal trademark law). Regardless of whether
the speech is protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, trademark laws are
regulations of "speech," not of economic conduct, because they restrict what words, symbols, and other
signs can be used in expression based on the content of the message-that is, whether this use of the
mark communicates a confusing or diluting message. Id. at 409-12. Moreover, national trademark laws
are government, not private, restrictions of speech, because governments restrict and punish speech
when they enact trademark laws and enforce private trademark rights using injunctions or damage
awards. Id. at 407-09.
In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court defines commercial speech as "speech which does
.no more than propose a commercial transaction."' Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). A restriction of misleading uses of a mark in commercial speech would be
constitutionally justifiable in the United States because untruthful commercial speech is not protected by
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 535 & n. 12 (1987); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of
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With the recent expansion of trademark rights and the increased
protection of speech-including commercial expression-there are a growing
number of potential conflicts between laws prohibitin8 unauthorized use of
another's mark and the right to freedom of expression. In the United States,
for example, federal trademark law now applies to the unauthorized use of
trademarks in noncommercial speech and nonmisleading commercial speech,
not just misleading commercial speech.7 Some courts have held that federal
infringement statutes are not limited to profit-seeking uses of trademarks and
may be applied to unauthorized uses of a mark by political, religious, and
the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 165-66; Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE
L.J. 147, 221 (1998); Ramsey, supra, at 412-20. Nonmisleading commercial speech and noncommercial
speech are protected by the First Amendment, but can still be restricted by the government as long as the
regulation satisfies intermediate or strict constitutional scrutiny, respectively. Ramsey, supra, at 421-46.
For the standards permitting speech restrictions in human rights treaties, see infra Subsection 11.B.3.
6. For the perspective of U.S. scholars, see, for example, Keith Aoki, How the World
Dreams Itself To Be American: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of
Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523, 538-43 (1997);
Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful
Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 975-77 (2007); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 721, 796-816 (2004); Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First
Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 48, 55-76 (1997); Denicola,
supra note 5; Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark and
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 939-52 (1986); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397,
399-412 (1990); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values: How
To Stop Worrying and Learn To Love Ambiguity [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights
and Expressive Values], in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 261, 261-67 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in
Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 890-906 (2005); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 972-78 (1993); Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech:
Establishing the First Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1, 60-102
(1991); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1697-1713 (1999); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody,
and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1327, 1331-32 (2006); Ramsey, supra
note 5, at 383-90, 395-404; Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus That
the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3,
8-31 (2005); and Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment
Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1082-99, 1107-16 (1986).
For a European perspective on the conflict between trademark law and the right to freedom of
expression, see, for example, Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Marks and Human Rights, in 18 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 335 (Paul Torremans ed., 2008) [hereinafter IP&HR]; Christophe
Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression-The Proportionality of Criticism, INT'L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 317, 317-27 (2007); and Katja Weckstrdm, The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big
Business: Comparing Approaches to the Balancing of Societal Interests Behind Trademark Protection,
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671 (2007).
For an analysis of the general conflict between intellectual property and human rights, see
IP&HR, supra; Christophe Geiger, "Constitutionalising" Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 371 (2006); Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of
Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268 (2004); Laurence R.
Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 29 (2004); Laurence R. Heifer, Toward a Human Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007) [hereinafter Heifer, Toward a
Human Rights Framework]; and Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a
Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007).
7. Ramsey, supra note 5, at 395-404.
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social organizations where such use is likely to cause confusion.8 Courts have
applied infringement law to noncommercial and mixed
commercial/noncommercial speech, including unauthorized uses of marks in
domain names of Internet parody sites (for example, use of the PETA mark in
the domain name peta.org linked to the "People Eating Tasty Animals" parody
website); in the titles or content of books (for example, use of the marks of Dr.
Seuss Enterprises in The Cat Not in the Hat parody of the O.J. Simpson trial
written in the style of Dr. Seuss); in magazines (for example, use of the
Michelob Dry marks in a fake "Michelob Oily" advertisement in a humor
magazine commenting on water pollution); and in films (for example, use of
the trademarked Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders outfits in the pornographic
film Debbie Does Dallas and of Dairy Queen's mark in the title of the film
Dairy Queens about beauty pageants in the Midwest).9
Moreover, U.S. federal trademark law now applies to unauthorized use
of a mark similar to another's famous mark in commercial expression where
there is "dilution," but no confusion, competition, or actual economic injury.1l
Third parties can dilute a famous mark by using a similar mark (such as
"Kodak" bicycles) to create an association that impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark or harms its reputation. 1' Firms can also get trademark rights
in descriptive terms and prevent competitors and others from using this
language as part of a brand name (the "Park 'N Fly" mark for airport parking
lot services in "Dollar Park and Fly"), slogan (the "Thirst Aid" mark for
beverages in "Gatorade is Thirst Aid"), or domain name (the "The Children's
Place" mark for clothing in "thechildrensplace.com" for a website) in cases
where it is questionable that this commercial speech is truly "misleading"
under the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 12 Scholars
argue that some of these U.S. laws may unconstitutionally restrict protected
expression. 13 Can the United States and other states amend their national
8. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86,
92-93 (2d Cir. 1997); Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1164 (S.D. Fla. 2000); MGM v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 874-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
9. E.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362 (4th
Cir. 2001); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguins Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir. 1994); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1979); Am. Dairy Queen Corp.
v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D. Minn. 1998).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
11. Id. § 1125(c)(2).
12. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985); TCPIP Holding Co.,
Inc. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats
Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment,
70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1110-21 (2003) [hereinafter Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks]; Ramsey, supra
note 5, at 414-21.
13. For example, the constitutionality of federal and state dilution laws in the United States is
discussed in Richard B. Biagi, The Intersection of First Amendment Commercial Speech Analysis and
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: A Jurisprudential Roadmap, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 867, 875-89
(2001); Denicola, supra note 5, at 194-95; Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay
Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 147-48 (1989); Mary LaFrance, No Reason To Live: Dilution
Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 711 (2007); Malla
Pollack, Time To Dilute the Dilution Statute and What Not To Do When Opposing Legislation, 78 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 519, 540-41 (1996); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds:
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEx. L. REV. 507, 510-11, 546-58, 561 (2008); Rebecca
Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK
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trademark laws to make them more speech-protective without violating their
obligations to protect trademarks under the Paris Convention and TRIPS?
This Article argues that the obligations in the trademark provisions of
the Paris Convention and TRIPS are sufficiently flexible to allow member
states to protect speech in various ways in their domestic trademark laws. Part
II discusses the specific provisions of these agreements that allow states to
protect speech interests without violating their international trademark
obligations. These agreements expressly provide that members can exclude
certain terms or other "signs" from protectable trademark subject matter, limit
the scope of rights conferred by a trademark, implement limited exceptions to
those rights, and tailor the remedies imposed in trademark disputes.
Importantly, the TRIPS provision allowing limited exceptions to trademark
rights to protect third-party interests (Article 17) gives members significantly
more discretion to limit markholder rights when compared to similar
copyright and patent provisions in TRIPS.
14
As set forth below, Article 6quinquies(B) of the Paris Convention and
Article 15(2) of TRIPS allow members to refuse to protect trademark rights in
descriptive terms regardless of any acquired distinctiveness.' 5 Members may
also implement a commercial use requirement for a prima facie trademark
infringement case, as TRIPS Article 16(1) only requires states to prevent uses
of marks that cause a likelihood of confusion "in the course of trade."' 6 States
can therefore exempt from trademark liability unauthorized use of another's
mark in political speech and other types of noncommercial expression.
Moreover, TRIPS Article 17 permits member states to implement "limited
exceptions" to trademark rights; thus, among other things, members can also
provide exemptions for nontrademark uses of marks or, alternatively, certain
nontrademark uses of marks, such as uses in news reporting, literary or artistic
works, comparative advertising, and parodies, satire, and other commentary.'
7
States can also decline to enact strong dilution laws without violating
their international obligations. While it applies to uses of marks on dissimilar
goods or services, Article 16(3) of TRIPS requires only that member states
prohibit third-party registration or use of "well-known" trademarks to
"indicate a connection between [the third party's] goods or services and the
owner of the registered trademark" where that use is likely to damage the
LAW & THEORY, supra note 6, at 294, 312-22; and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual
Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 732-39
(2003). I have argued it is unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence for the government to protect trademark rights in descriptive terms, Ramsey, Descriptive
Trademarks, supra note 12, at 1146-74, and noted that the constitutionality of other trademark laws
regulating noncommercial speech and nonmisleading commercial speech is also questionable, Ramsey,
supra note 5, at 388, 404-57. Scholars have also considered the constitutionality of core trademark
infringement laws, see Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 737, 739, 748-56 (2007), and the doctrine of initial interest confusion (which courts have applied
in cases involving unauthorized use of marks in domain names linked to websites and in keywords to
trigger comparative advertising), see Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 105, 150-59 (2005).
14. Compare TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 17, with id. arts. 13, 30.
15. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15(2); Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6quinquies(B)(2); see
infra Section II.A.
16. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1); see infra Sub-subsection II.B.2.b.
17. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 17; see infra Section lI.C.
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interests of the markholder. 18 Unfortunately for free speech advocates, new
bilateral agreements requiring stronger protection of well-known marks may
reduce some states' flexibility to P9rotect speech in their domestic trademark
laws, including the United States. States can provide more robust domestic
protection for trademarks than is required by the minimum standards of the
Paris Convention and TRIPS, as these international agreements do not
currently contain mandatory ceilings on trademark protection.
Finally, courts in member states have the flexibility under TRIPS'
enforcement provisions to tailor trademark remedies in ways that protect
speech. For example, courts can award damages or require a disclaimer in lieu
of granting an injunction. 20 In these and other provisions, the Paris
Convention and TRIPS give states the flexibility to decline to adopt a
trademark system that provides expansive, property-like protection for
trademarks in ways that harm the free flow of information and ideas.
In Part III, this Article evaluates how disputes involving conflicting
trademark and free speech rights should be resolved if a member of the WTO
elects to adopt more speech-protective trademark laws. If a WTO member
believes another member is violating its obligations under TRIPS or the
provisions of the Paris Convention incorporated into TRIPS (Paris Convention
Articles 1 through 12 and 19), it can file a complaint in the WTO Dispute
Settlement System set up by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). 1 The dispute would then be heard by
a WTO panel, and possibly appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. WTO panel
and Appellate Body reports are submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), which consists of all the WTO members. The DSB usually approves
of these reports, as it can only disapprove with full consensus of the
members.22 As of this writing, only a few international trademark disputes
have been adjudicated at the WTO, and they have not focused on the conflict
between international trademark and free speech rights.23
18. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(3). See generally FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, FAMOUS AND
WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2004 & 2007 Supp.) (discussing
international law relating to well-known marks).
19. See infra Subsection II.B.3.
20. See infra Section lI.D.
21. TRIPS requires compliance with Articles I through 12, and with Article 19, of the Paris
Convention. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 2(1). Both agreements create international obligations to protect
trademarks, but TRIPS was the first multilateral treaty to introduce a mechanism for imposing sanctions
against members who fail to implement laws that comply with their international obligations. See
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 35-37, 41-
43, 215 (2d ed. 2008).
22. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 16(4)
& 17(14), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]; see also Joel P. Trachtman, The
Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 333, 336 (1999). Past reports are not binding
in future decisions, but panels and the Appellate Body take them into account because they may create
legitimate expectations among WTO members. Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 7.30, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
23. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China-Measures]; Panel
Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS I 74/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC-GI] (complaint
filed by the United States); Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998, WT/DSI76/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter US-Section 211]. Note that there is a WTO
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If such a dispute were to come before the WTO, Articles 1(1), 7, and 8
of TRIPS specifically provide that members have flexibility in deciding how
to implement their international obligations, and may consider the public
interest when doing so. 24 Moreover, the WTO Agreement requires WTO
panels and the Appellate Body to use customary rules of treaty interpretation
to clarify the meaning of the provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS,
and expressly prohibits them from creating new rights or obligations for
members. WTO jurists should therefore focus on the ordinary meaning of
the terms of the agreements in context and in light of their objective and
purpose. They should also take into account applicable international laws,
including human rights treaties requiring protection of the right to freedom of
26
expression.
Part III also argues that WTO panels and the Appellate Body should
narrowly interpret ambiguous obligations to protect and enforce trademarks,
broadly interpret TRIPS Article 17 when trademark and free speech rights
conflict, and avoid an activist interpretation of the trademark provisions that
adopts a particular solution to this conflict.2 7 For example, WTO jurists should
not conclude that TRIPS requires states to apply trademark law to certain
nontrademark uses of marks or exempt noncommercial uses of marks from
trademark liability, as there are no such mandatory requirements in the terms
of the Paris Convention or TRIPS. Unless a state is in clear violation of an
explicit and unambiguous obligation under these agreements, WTO jurists
should defer to national interpretations of vague or broad trademark
provisions in cases involving free speech interests. States should be allowed to
experiment with finding the proper balance between trademark and free
speech rights.
Finally, in Part IV, the Article evaluates whether member states should
amend the trademark provisions of the Paris Convention or TRIPS to
explicitly permit or require states to protect the right to freedom of expression
in their domestic trademark laws. Specific, mandatory speech-protective
ceilings on trademark rights could increase protection of expression in less-
speech-protective states and discourage states from further increasing
trademark rights in speech-harmful ways in bilateral or regional trade
28
agreements. Unfortunately, it may be practically and politically difficult for
members to agree on how international trademark law should be changed to
accommodate free speech concerns. There are many different national views
about the proper scope of trademark and free speech rights. Even if consensus
were possible on some amendments, the new rules may not be as speech-
protective as some current national trademark laws. Specific exemptions to
panel report that is similar, but not identical, to EC-GI, supra, that was issued in connection with
Australia's complaint filed in that same dispute. See Panel Report, European Communities-Protection
of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT1DS290/R
(Mar. 15, 2005). All citations in this Article will be to the panel report issued in connection with the
United States's complaint (WT/DS 174/R).
24. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 1(1), 7, 8; infra Section HI.A.
25. See infra Sections III.B-C.
26. See infra Section III.B.
27. See infra Section III.C.
28. See infra Section V.A.
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trademark rights could become ineffective, undesirable, or obsolete due to
changes in society, technology, or national trademark or free speech laws.
Member states should not add specific exceptions to trademark rights to these
international agreements until more states have had a chance to experiment at
the domestic level and find the right balance between trademark and free
speech rights.
Alternatively, member states could amend the Paris Convention or
TRIPS to include language that explicitly permits or requires states to
generally protect the "right to freedom of expression" when implementing
29their international trademark obligations. Such an amendment may increase
the chance that WTO panels and the Appellate Body will consider free speech
interests-not just trade interests-when interpreting the trademark provisions
of the Paris Convention and TRIPS. Yet it may not have much effect on
national laws. The two international agreements already permit members to
protect speech interests and international law recognizing the principle of
freedom of expression is relevant to interpretation of the treaty terms.
Therefore, this revision is not necessary for those states that want to enact
more speech-protective trademark laws. Moreover, a vague international
obligation to protect speech in national trademark laws will not effectively
increase protection for expression in less-speech-protective states. If the
international obligations are not specific, many states-especially those with
civil law systems-will likely continue to protect speech (or not) at the same
level in national trademark laws.
Instead of seeking speech-friendly amendments to the Paris Convention
or TRIPS, free speech advocates should instead focus on encouraging states to
amend their domestic trademark laws to better protect speech interests.
Member states should wait to amend these international agreements until there
is greater consensus on the proper balance between trademark and free speech
rights. They should also refrain from creating new bilateral, regional, or
international trademark laws that limit state discretion to protect freedom of
expression in domestic trademark laws.
II. THE TRADEMARK PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS CONVENTION AND TRIPS
GIVE STATES FLEXIBILITY To PROTECT FREE SPEECH
IN THEIR TRADEMARK LAWS
Many states protect the free flow of information and ideas from
restriction by the government. Freedom of expression is acknowledged by
some countries as a fundamental right in their constitutions, such as in the
United States's Bill of Rights. 30 Other countries, such as New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and Australia, have no constitutional free speech right but
still recognize the right to freedom of expression in statutes or cases.3 1 As
29. See infra Section IV.B.
30. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 2(b); GG [Constitution] art.
5 (F.R.G.); IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40(6)(1); KENPO [Constitution] art. 21, para. 1 (Japan); S. AFR. CONST.
1996 § 16; see KROToszYNsgi, supra note 4, at 12, 26-51, 93-104, 139-45.
31. E.g., New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 14; Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12
(U.K.); id. sch. 1, pt. 1, art. 10; see KROTOSZYNSKi, supra note 4, at 190, 198, 206 (noting that the
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discussed later, many states are bound to protect this right by human rights
treaties.
32
At the same time, some commentators argue that markholders have
property rights in their trademarks and note that property rights are also
protected by national constitutions and some human rights treaties, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights. 33 In a recent case before the
European Court of Human Rights involving the mark "Budweiser" for beer,
the Court agreed that trademarks could be regarded as property rights for
purposes of human rights analysis.34 Regardless of whether trademarks are
property rights, states must balance trademark rights against the right of free
speech. Some states provide strong protection for trademarks and speech
interests in their trademark statutes and court decisions.
The United States is a good example. U.S. federal trademark law
provides strong protection for trademarks, including dilution protection for
famous marks.36 Yet the United States also protects free speech values by
exempting from dilution liability the fair use of another's mark "other than as
a designation of source" in comparative advertising, parody, criticism, and
commentary; news reporting and news commentary; and noncommercial uses
of a mark.-7 U.S. trademark law also protects speech interests by requiring
distinctiveness of trademarks for protection and a likelihood of confusion for
infringement claims and permitting the fair use of descriptive terms to
describe the qualities or characteristics of goods or services.38 In addition,
U.S. courts also create and apply speech-protective trademark laws, such as a
balancing test used in infringement cases involving unauthorized use of marks
in the titles or content of songs (such as Barbie Girl), films (such as Ginger &
Fred), and other types of literary or artistic expression; free speech rights
United Kingdom has no written constitution but that the U.K. Human Rights Act establishes a statutory
right to free speech and U.K. courts also protect free speech values); David S. Bogen, The Religion
Clauses and Freedom of Speech in Australia and the United States: Incidental Restrictions and
Generally Applicable Laws, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 53, 63-82 (1997) (discussing how Australian courts
protect freedom of speech); Roy Jordan, Research Note, Free Speech and the Constitution (June 4,
2002), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2001-02/02rn42.htm (same).
32. See infra Subsection III.B.3.
33. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol 1, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Burkhart Goebel,
Geographical Indications and Trademarks-The Road from Doha, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 964, 971-72
(2003); see also Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, an Idea Whose Time Has Gone;
Brand Equity as Protectable Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267-70, 282-
99 (1994). Some human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
do "not contain property protection provisions." Rahmatian, supra note 6, at 345.
34. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 72-78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11,
2007), http://www.echr.coe.int; see also Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual
Property and the European Court of Human Rights, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 25, 27-28, 43-45;
Rahmatian, supra note 6, at 346-47.
35. See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 25 3.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)-(2) (2006).
37. Id. § 1125(c)(3).
38. Id. §§ 1052, 1114(1)(a), 1115(b)(4), 1125(a)(l)(A). For a discussion of the various ways
the United States protects speech in its trademark laws, see, for example, Dreyfuss, Reconciling
Trademark Rights and Expressive Values, supra note 6, at 267-80; Pierre N. Leval, Trademark:
Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004); Lisa P. Ramsey, First Amendment
Limitations on Trademark Rights, in 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES
AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGrrAL AGE 147 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
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trump trademark rights unless this use of the mark is not artistically relevant,
or it explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.39 U.S.
courts have also held that the First Amendment prohibits application of
trademark dilution law to uses of marks in noncommercial speech 40 and have
declined to find infringement or dilution of a trademark-even in a
commercial context-when the mark is used in a successful parody, such as
the "Chewy Vuiton" dog toy parodies of the Louis Vuitton handbags and
marks.4 '
Other states also protect speech interests in their domestic trademark
laws. For example, Australian trademark law currently requires an allegedly
infringing mark to be used as a mark for trademark liability 2 and does not
contain a cause of action for dilution.43 The Australian Trade Marks Office
has found certain uses of marks in parodies were not deceptively similar when
markholders filed oppositions to applications for trademark registration, such
as for "Tenfolds Grunge" for wine (a "cheeky reference" or parody of
"Penfolds Grange" wine), 44 "Dogue" for dog gifts (a parody of "Vogue"
magazine) 45 and "Dickheads" for matches (a parody of "Redheads"
matches). The Constitutional Court of South Africa narrowly construed its
trademark laws to protect speech interests in a case involving the unauthorized
use of the mark "Carling Black Label" and related marks for beer in the
parody "Black Labour" beer label displayed on the front of T-shirts sold for
profit.47 Citing the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of expression, a
French court allowed the nonprofit environmental group Greenpeace to use a
parody of the logo of oil company Esso on a website to criticize the company
and its industrial activities.48 For similar reasons, the German Federal Court of
Justice rejected a trademark claim by the distributor of Marlboro cigarettes
39. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
40. E.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30-33 (lst Cir. 1987)
(declining to find dilution under Maine law in suit by L.L. Bean against a third party who used its marks
in the parody "L.L. Beam Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog").
41. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260-62 (4th Cir.
2007).
42. Trade Marks Act, 1995, § 120(1) (Austl.); Top Heavy Pty Ltd. v. Kilin (1996) 34 I.P.R.
282, 285-87 (Austl.).
43. Daniel R. Shanahan & Annette Freeman, Australia, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOwN
MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 4-29, 4-34, 4-35.
44. Southcorp Ltd. v. McKeeman, [2006] ATMO 48, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/
sinodisp/au/cases/cth/ATMO/2006/48.html (Austl.).
45. Advance Magazine Publishers v. Bushby, [2004] ATMO 19, http://www.austlii.edu.au/
cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/ATMO/2004/19.html (Austl.).
46. Intermatch v. Dick Smith Investments, [2003] ATMO 18, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/ATMO/2003/18.html (Austl.); see also Lauren Eade, Getting Away with
(Brand) Murder: The Limits of Trademark Parody, INT'L L. OFFICE, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.inter
nationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=d30cba2 f-38ce-448b-99f5 -e0329cacfb If (discussing
these Australian cases).
47. Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. Aft. Breweries Int 'l (Finance) B. V. 2006 (1) SA 144
(CC) (S. Aft.), discussed in Daniel Greenberg, To Dilute Your Trademark-Just Add Parody, 27 EuR.
INTELL. PRoP. REv. 436 (2005).
48. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 4e ch., Nov. 16, 2005 (Fr.), reprinted
in [2006] E.T.M.R. 53 (rejecting the trademark and unfair parasitic competition claims); see Rahmatian,
supra note 6, at 349-50 (discussing the French case).
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and its request for an injunction to prevent an anti-smoking organization from
using the Marlboro marks in a parody of a Marlboro advertisement. 9
Commentators argue that national legislators and courts should further
protect speech interests in their trademark laws and have set forth various
proposals for speech-protective reforms. For example, in the United States,
scholars propose that the government eliminate trademark protection for
descriptive terms, 50 implement a trademark use requirement for trademark
liability,5 1 and enact a moratorium on injunctions in dilution cases and require
proof of actual injury for damages. 2 William McGeveran has suggested that
the U.S. Congress revise the federal trademark statute to exempt from liability
use of a mark in the content and relevant titles of communicative works, in
news reporting and news commentary, and in political speech (with some
exceptions). 3 Advocates of strong trademark protection may object to such
reforms on the grounds that some (or all) of these changes would violate
international obligations to protect trademarks.
Admittedly, the texts of the Paris Convention and TRIPS do not
explicitly mention "the right to freedom of expression" or "free speech."5"
Moreover, the legislative history of TRIPS suggests there were no significant
discussions among the negotiators about the potential or actual conflict
between trademark and free speech rights. 55 Regardless, this Article contends
that the provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS requiring protection of
trademark rights are sufficiently narrow and that the language in TRIPS
Article 17-which allows limited exceptions to trademark rights-is
sufficiently broad to allow members to incorporate free speech values into
their national trademark laws. 56 Among other things, member states may:
49. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 17, 1984 (F.G.R.), reprinted in
[1986] E.C.C. 1, 6-7; see Rahmatian, supra note 6, at 349 (discussing the German case).
50. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks, supra note 12, at 1169-74.
51. See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979-87 (2007); Margreth Barrett, Internet
Trademark Suits and the Demise of "Trademark Use," 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 378-79 (2006);
Mark A. Lemley & Stacey L. Dogan, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1669, 1694-98 (2007); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 608 (2004). For the opposite view that critiques this proposal, see generally
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007); and Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark
Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007).
52. LaFrance, supra note 13, at 722.
53. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 115-
19 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use]; William McGeveran, Trademarks
and Free Speech: A Safe Harbor Strategy (Feb. 10, 2010) (manuscript at 45, on file with author); see
also William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205 (2008).
54. See TRIPS, supra note 1; Paris Convention, supra note 1; Laurence R. Heifer, Human
Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 50-51
(2003).
55. World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Reports of Meetings of the Negotiating Group & Working Documents,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips~e/trips e.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (providing a link to
official documents from the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round trade talks on TRIPS under "Documents series:
MTN.GNG/NGI 11/ and "Documents series: MTN.GNGTRIPS").
56. For the sake of brevity, this Article does not address whether the right to freedom of
expression is harmed when governments refuse to register or protect certain trademarks in their national
trademark laws. See generally Jonathan Griffiths, Is There a Right to an Immoral Trade Mark, in
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(1) refuse to protect trademark rights in descriptive terms; (2) implement a
commercial use or trademark use requirement for prima facie trademark
liability; (3) refuse to enact a trademark dilution cause of action; and/or (4)
specifically exempt from trademark liability uses of marks in political
expression, news reporting, literary and artistic works, comparative
advertising, parody, satire, criticism, and other commentary.
Such speech-protective national trademark laws do not violate
international obligations to protect trademarks in the Paris Convention and
TRIPS. For purposes of this Article, the pertinent Paris Convention provisions
include international obligations relating to well-known marks (Article 6bis),
protection of marks registered in another member state (Article 6quinquies),
and unfair competition (Article lObis). TRIPS Article 2(1) requires WTO
members to comply with these Paris Convention provisions. The relevant
trademark provisions in TRIPS relate to protectable subject matter (Article
15), the scope of rights conferred by a trademark (Article 16), and exceptions
to trademark rights (Article 17). The enforcement provisions relevant to all
intellectual property rights are set forth in TRIPS Articles 41 through 61. As
explained below, the Paris Convention and TRIPS enable states to protect the
right to freedom of expression in domestic trademark laws by excluding
certain terms or other "signs" from protectable subject matter; limiting the
scope of rights conferred by a trademark; implementing limited exceptions to
trademark rights; and tailoring the remedies imposed in trademark disputes to
protect speech interests.57
A. Protectable Trademark Subject Matter
First, the Paris Convention and TRIPS allow member states to protect
speech interests by preventing acquisition of trademark rights in certain types
of expression. Article 15 of TRIPS defines the subject matter-the types of
words, names, and other "signs"-which may constitute a protectable
trademark. 58 Per Article 15(1), "[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs,
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those
of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark., 59 The
range of protectable signs is quite broad; "words including personal names,
IP&HR, supra note 6, at 309 (discussing the relevance of human rights treaties to U.K. and European
laws denying trademark registration and protection on grounds of public policy and morality). The focus
of this Article is on the conflict between free speech rights and the protection of trademark rights by
states, whereby governments limit the unauthorized use of trademarks by third parties.
57. Previous scholarship has focused on the flexibility states have to protect the public interest
and human rights in the patent and copyright provisions of TRIPS, not the trademark provisions. See,
e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a
European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (1998); Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order
for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 1469 (2007); Neil W. Netanel,
The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 441 (1997); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and
the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 861,
863 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2004).
58. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15(1); see also EC--GI, supra note 23, T 7.600; GERVAIS, supra
note I, at 266.
59. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15(l).
2010] Free Speech and International Trademark Obligations 417
letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of colours as well as
any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as
trademarks.,
60
Yet not all signs must be protected as marks. TRIPS Article 15(1)
expressly allows members to deny registration and protection for signs that
are not "capable of distinguishing" among goods or services, 6 1 such as the
generic term "computer" for a personal computer, and signs that are not
"visually perceptible," 62 such as marks consisting of sounds or smells. 63
Moreover, Article 15(2) provides that members may refuse to register and
protect certain signs for additional reasons as long as the "other grounds" for
denial "do not derogate from the provisions of the Paris Convention."64 The
WTO Appellate Body in United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998 (US-Section 211) specifically rejected the argument that Article
15(2) only permits those exceptions to registration or protection expressly set
forth in Article 15(1). It held "that 'other grounds' for the denial of
registration within the meaning of Article 15.2 of the TRIPS Agreement are
not limited to grounds expressly provided for in the exceptions contained in
the Paris Convention (1967) or the TRIPS Agreement.' 65 Thus, members may
refuse to register or protect signs as trademarks in two situations: (1) where
the Paris Convention or TRIPS specifically allows members to deny
trademark registration and protection for this sign, or (2) where the grounds
for refusal of trademark registration and protection is not inconsistent with the
66
express terms of the Paris Convention and TRIPS.
Paris Convention Article 6(1) provides members with significant
discretion in how they administer their trademark system; it says: "The
conditions for the filing and registration of trademarks shall be determined in
each country of the Union by its domestic legislation." 67 Per Article
6quinquies(A)(1), members are generally required to accept for filing and
protect any trademark registered in the state of origin "as it is," but this rule is
subject to the exceptions set forth in Article 6quinquies. 68 Article
6quinquies(B)(2) provides that states "may" deny registration or protection of
signs that: (1) "are devoid of any distinctive character"; (2) "consist
exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the
kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods,




63. Marks that are not visually perceptible are protected in the United States if they are
distinctive. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (noting that NBC's three
chimes and the scent of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread are protectable marks under U.S. law,
among other distinctive sounds or scents). As noted by Professor Gervais, countries that protect
"olfactory and sound marks" register them "using musical notations, descriptions, or chemical
formulas." GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 267.
64. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15(2).
65. US-Section 211, supra note 23, 178 (italicization removed).
66. Id., discussed in GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 268.
67. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
68. Id. art. 6quinquies(A)(1). Although this provision requires registration of a foreign
trademark "as it is" (or "telle quelle"), there is disagreement on whether this rule concerns only the form
or also the content of marks. CORREA, supra note 1, at 175-78.
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America" for beer); or (3) signs "customary in the current language or in the
bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country where
protection is claimed" (such as the generic terms or common names
"Shredded Wheat" for breakfast cereal or "Escalator" for a moving
walkway).69 Thus, the Paris Convention expressly allows states to deny
trademark protection to nondistinctive signs and to descriptive and generic
signs regardless of whether they are distinctive. 70 If states implement all three
limitations on protectable trademark subject matter, they will better protect the
free flow of commercial speech and promote competition, as these laws will
enable companies to use the full range of language to describe their wares in
their brand names, slogans, and domain names.
TRIPS Article 15(1) provides that members "may make registrability
depend on distinctiveness acquired through use" when signs are not inherently
distinctive. 72 Inherently distinctive marks include fanciful marks (coined
words, such as "Kodak" cameras), arbitrary marks ("Apple" computers), and
suggestive marks ("Tide" laundry detergent). Yet Article 15(1) does not
require members to protect descriptive signs with "acquired" distinctiveness;
the language "may" is permissive, not mandatory (unlike "shall"). As
explained above, the Paris Convention allows member states to refuse to
register or protect trademark rights in marks that consist exclusively of
descriptive or generic signs, and TRIPS allows members to deny trademark
rights on grounds other than those set forth in TRIPS Article 15(1) provided
they are consistent with the Paris Convention. Thus, a state's decision to
categorically exclude descriptive signs from protectable trademark subject
matter-regardless of whether they have acquired distinctiveness-is
consistent with the express terms of both agreements. 73 If members decide to
exclude descriptive signs from protectable subject matter under Paris
Convention Article 6quinquies(B)(2) and TRIPS Article 15(2), however, they
must still provide effective protection against unfair competition.74
69. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6quinquies(B)(2), discussed in LADAS, supra note 1,
at 1230-36.
70. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6quinquies(B)(2). The first category of signs can
overlap with the other two, as generic and descriptive signs may be devoid of distinctive character, but
the categories are different. Descriptive signs and even generic signs may acquire distinctiveness (that is,
identify and distinguish the source of goods or services) if governments grant a markholder exclusive
rights to use this sign, Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks, supra note 12, at 1151, and certain signs that
are not descriptive or generic may still be deemed insufficiently distinctive for protection, LADAS, supra
note 1, at 1230-32, such as a simple geometric shape or single color.
71. See generally Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1980) (discussing why the government should not protect trademark rights in generic terms);
Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks, supra note 12, at 1169-74 (arguing that the government should
eliminate trademark protection for descriptive terms); Ramsey, supra note 38, at 150-52 (discussing the
distinctiveness requirement).
72. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15(1).
73. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 15(2); Paris Convention, supra note I, art. 6quinquies(B)(2); see
DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224; LADAS, supra note 1, at 1230-35, 1238-40; Paul J. Heald,
Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 639-40 (1996); G.E. Evans, TRIPS and Trademark Use, in TRADE MARK USE
279, 293 (J. Phillips & I. Simon eds., 2005).
74. Paris Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6quinquies(B), lObis; see infra Subsection II.B.1
(discussing Paris Convention Article I Obis).
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This interpretation of Article 15(1) is supported by the decision of the
WTO Appellate Body in US-Section 211, which said:
If Article 15.1 required the registration of any and every sign or combination of signs that
meets the distinctiveness criteria specified in that Article, then WTO members would be
deprived of the legislative discretion they enjoyed under Article 6(1) of the Paris
Convention (1967). In our view, Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement limits the right of
Members to determine the 'conditions' for filing and registration of trademarks under
their domestic legislation pursuant to Article 6(1) only as it relates to the distinctiveness
requirements enunciated in Article 15.1.75
Such an interpretation of Article 15(1) is also supported by a comparison
of the language in Article 15 with the comparable patent law provision
relating to patentable subject matter, TRIPS Article 27. Article 27 provides
that "[s]ubject to the provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application. 76 TRIPS Article 15 does not say trademark
registration or protection "shall be available" for distinctive signs (that is, it
does not say that such signs shall be registered or protected as trademarks), it
just says such signs "shall be capable of constituting a trademark" and "shall
be eligible for registration as trademarks."
77
The United States refuses to protect trademark rights in generic signs
regardless of whether they have allegedly become distinctive. 71 Yet
descriptive signs can be registered on the principal trademark register and
protected in trademark disputes in the United States if the sign acquires
distinctiveness or "secondary meaning" due to advertising and sales of the
trademarked goods or services. 79 1 have argued in prior work that protection of
trademark rights in terms that describe the quality or characteristics of
products improperly restricts commercial expression and harms competition
75. US-Section 211, supra note 23, 165 (emphasis omitted) (italicization removed),
discussed in CORREA, supra note 1, at 178. Professor Dinwoodie and his coauthors note this is a narrow
reading of Article 15(1). DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 224. Professor Gervais believes such
language in the US-Section 211 Report "may eventually be used to limit the rights of foreign trademark
rightsholders." GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 272.
76. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (emphasis added). The provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
TRIPS Article 27 contain specific subject matter that members "may exclude from patentability." Id. art.
27(2)-(3).
77. Id. art. 15 (emphases added).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1065(4) (2006); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531 n.7 (1987); Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc., 240 F.3d 251,
255 (4th Cir. 2001).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0; KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 122 (2004); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 165-66 (3d
Cir. 2000). In the European Union, Article 7.1 of the EU Community Trade Mark Regulation includes
signs listed in Paris Convention Article 6quinquies(B)(2) (nondistinctive, descriptive, and generic signs)
among the signs that can be refused registration. Council Regulation 207/2009, On the Community
Trade Mark, art. 7.1(b)-(d), 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 3 (EC). Per Article 7.3, however, these provisions "shall
not apply if the trade mark has become distinctive in relation to the goods or services for which
registration is requested in consequence of the use which has been made of it." Id. art. 7.3, at 4; see also
Council Directive 2008/95, To Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks,
art. 3(3), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 27 (EU) (stating that descriptive terms may be registered if they acquire
secondary meaning); Joined Cases C-108 & 109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und Vertriebs
Gmbh (WSC) v. Boots- und Segelzhubeh6r Walter Huber, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2779 (involving registration of
the geographical name Chiemsee-a Bavarian lake and popular tourist attraction-for clothing).
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when it limits the descriptive words available for use by competitors as part of
a brand name, slogan, or domain name.80 If the United States or any other
state decided to refuse trademark registration and protection to both generic
and descriptive signs regardless of any distinctiveness acquired through use,
this rule would not violate the Paris Convention or TRIPS for the reasons
discussed above. Moreover, members may also offer lesser protection for
descriptive signs that have acquired distinctiveness, such as by requiring the
infringing signs and goods/services to be virtually identical or by requiring a
heightened level of consumer confusion.81
Advocates of descriptive trademark protection may argue that states
cannot categorically exclude descriptive signs from registration and protection
under the Paris Convention or TRIPS because such signs can acquire
distinctiveness through use and thus become "capable of constituting a
trademark" and "eligible for registration" under TRIPS Article 15(1). 82 Under
this view, members can only refuse to register or protect descriptive terms on
a case-by-case basis after determining that the particular descriptive sign is
not distinctive or capable of becoming distinctive.8 3 This argument should fail
because TRIPS states that distinctive signs which normally qualify as
protectable subject matter under Article 15(1) can be refused registration and
protection if an exception applies.84 An olfactory or auditory mark that is
distinctive but not visually perceptible can be refused registration per the last
sentence of TRIPS Article 15(1). States may similarly categorically refuse to
register and protect distinctive marks that consist exclusively of descriptive
signs per Paris Convention Article 6quinquies(B)(2) and TRIPS Article 15(2).
Case-by-case analysis of the distinctiveness of a descriptive sign is not
required. Countries may elect to grant trademark rights in descriptive signs,
but there is no obligation to do this in the Paris Convention or TRIPS.
B. The Scope of Rights Conferred by a Trademark
The Paris Convention and TRIPS also contain obligations to prevent
certain uses of trademarks that create confusion or a likelihood of confusion,
as well as third-party uses of "well-known" marks that indicate a connection
with the markholder and are likely to damage its interests. This Section
discusses the trademark rights provisions and limitations in their scope that
allow states to protect free speech interests.
80. See Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks, supra note 12, at 1099-01, 1146-74. But see Leval,
supra note 38, at 192-94 (arguing that free expression is sufficiently protected in the marketplace if
courts enforce a narrow scope of exclusivity for descriptive terms that have acquired distinctiveness and
only prohibit the use of an identical mark in the same area of commerce).
81. If they use this approach, members must still comply with their other international
obligations, such as national treatment. E.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3.
82. TRIPS, supra note I, art. 15(1).
83. Cf Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6quinquies(C)(1) ("In determining whether a mark
is eligible for protection, all the factual circumstances must be taken into consideration, particularly the
length of time the mark has been in use.").
84. See US-Section 211, supra note 23, 155.
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1. Paris Convention: Prevention of Unfair Competition
In the Paris Convention, Article 6bis (the well-known marks provision
discussed later in Subsection II.B.3) and Article lObis contain the only
"guaranteed minimum rights" for markholders. 85 Article 1 Obis does not
specifically refer to "trademark" rights, but it still covers certain confusing
uses of a competitor's marks. Per Article l0bis(l), "[t]he countries of the
Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries effective protection
against unfair competition."86 Article l Obis(3)(l) requires member states to
specifically prohibit "all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any
means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor."87 This specific obligation to protect
against unfair competition in the trademark context is limited to (1) uses of a
mark that "create confusion" (2) with a competitor's establishment, goods, or
industrial or commercial activities.
Article 1Obis(3)(1) therefore does not require states to protect
trademarks from any unauthorized use by third parties. First, there is no
obligation to prohibit nonconfusing uses of a mark by competitors. For
example, a third party can use its competitor's mark in a comparative
advertisement if the ad does not create confusion. Second, Article lObis(3)(1)
does not require states to prohibit confusing use of trademarks by third parties
who are not competitors, such as a disgruntled customer's use of a firm's
trademark on an Intemet website to parody or criticize the markholder. An
unauthorized use of the mark need only be prevented under national law if it
creates confusion "with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor."88 Although Article 1Obis(I) broadly
requires states to provide "effective protection against unfair competition," the
more specific (and relevant) language of Article l0bis(3)(1) suggests that this
Article of the Paris Convention does not require states to provide property-like
protection for trademarks at the expense of free speech interests of
competitors and the public.
2. TRIPS: Prevention of Likelihood of Confusion
Additional international obligations regarding the scope of trademark
rights are set forth in TRIPS in Article 16, entitled "Rights Conferred." The
"likelihood of confusion" provision, TRIPS Article 16(1), provides in
pertinent part:
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third
parties not having the owner's consent from using in the course of trade identical or
similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of
which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of
85. GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 274.
86. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. lObis(l).
87. Id. art. lObis(3)(1).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
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confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a
likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. 89
As noted by the WTO Appellate Body, the "exclusive rights [in Article
16(1)] protect the owner against infringement of the registered trademark by
unauthorized third parties." 90 Like Paris Convention Article lObis(3)(1),
TRIPS Article 16(1) contains various limitations on the obligations to protect
trademark rights that allow states to protect free speech values in their
trademark laws. As discussed below, Article 16(1) only requires members to
protect against use of (a) registered trademarks, (b) used in the course of trade,
(c) where the signs and goods/services are identical or similar to those of the
markholder, and (d) this use causes a likelihood of confusion.91
a. Registered Trademarks
First, TRIPS Article 16(1) obligates members to grant markholders with
an exclusive right to prevent likelihood of confusion only when the mark is
"registered., 92 Of course, states can opt to provide infringement protection to
distinctive unregistered marks-the United States, for example, protects
marks based on use-but WTO members are not required to do this by Article
16(1) because of the "registered" limitation. 93 Paris Convention Article
lObis's unfair competition provision is not limited to registered marks-as
discussed above, it does not mention "trademarks" at all-and thus states still
have to prevent unauthorized uses of unregistered marks by competitors which
create confusion covered by that provision. If the parties are not competitors
and the mark is not registered, then neither Paris Convention Article lObis nor
TRIPS Article 16(1) applies.
If states require registration of a mark for protection against
infringement, they would give better notice to potential users of the mark that
another claims trademark rights in this expression. Such a rule may chill less
speech by providing third parties with a better understanding of whether this
language is likely to be protected against infringement. On the other hand, a
registration requirement for infringement protection would disadvantage
successful businesses that failed to file an application to register the mark with
the national trademark office and could harm consumers confused by a
competitor's use of the unregistered mark to identify its own goods or
services.
89. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
90. See US-Section 211, supra note 23,1 186.
91. See EC-GI, supra note 23, $ 7.601. The use must also be unauthorized. TRIPS, supra
note 1, art. 16(1). This limitation will not be discussed here, however, as it is not relevant to the potential
conflict between trademark and free speech rights.
92. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1); see EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.600; US-Section 211,
supra note 23, 186.
93. CoRREA, supra note 1, at 185; GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 274-75; Katja Weckstrom, When
Two Giants Collide: Article 17 and the Scope of Trademark Protection Afforded Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 167, 182-83 (2007).
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b. Use of the Mark in the Course of Trade
A second limitation on the trademark rights conferred in Article 16(1) is
that member states need only enforce this infringement right against a third
party "using" the mark "in the course of trade." 94 A state can therefore refuse
to enjoin or punish use of a mark outside "the course of trade," even if that use
of the mark is likely to cause confusion, as long as the state complies with its
other international obligations. 95 Although the phrase "use . . . in the course of
trade" also appears in Paris Convention Article lObis(3)(3),96 neither the Paris
Convention nor TRIPS defines the phrase and its meaning has not yet been
interpreted by any WTO panels or by the Appellate Body. According to
Carlos Correa, who was closely involved in "the inception and
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement," 97 the phrase "using in the course of
trade" refers to use of a mark "in commercial activities." 98 The "in the course
of trade" language is more common in regional and national laws in Europe,
such as Articles 5 and 6 of the European Union Trade Mark Directive,
Articles 9(1) and 12 of the European Council Trade Mark Regulation, and
Section 10(1) of the United Kingdom's Trade Marks Act. 99 The European
Court of Justice has interpreted the phrase to mean use of another's marks that
"takes place in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic
advantage and not as a private matter."'
100
Some states and commentators may argue that the phrase "using in the
course of trade" in Article 16(1) also means use of the mark as a trademark or
designation of source.'01 Commentators and courts are divided on whether the
phrase "use in the course of trade" in regional or national trademark laws
requires a "trademark use" of the mark. 10 2 The European Court of Justice has
held that the phrase "use in the course of trade" in the EU Trade Mark
94. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
95. E.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 1(3), 3, 4, 16(2)-(3); Paris Convention, supra note 1, arts.
2, 6bis, l0bis.
96. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. l0bis(3)(3).
97. CORREA, supra note 1, at viii.
98. Id. at 186.
99. See Trade Marks Act, 1994, § 10(1) (U.K.); Council Regulation 207/2009, On the
Community Trade Mark, arts. 9(1), 12, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 5 (EC); Council Directive 2008/95, To
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, arts. 5, 6, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25,
28-29 (EU). Mostert says the use in the course of trade requirement for infringement under Article 5 of
the EU Trade Mark Directive is "parallel to the US 'noncommercial use' defense" in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006). MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-119 n. 283.
100. Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10273, T 40.
101. See, e.g., Weckstrtm, supra note 93, at 182-83 (stating that the third party must use the
mark "as a trade or service mark" for Article 16(1) to apply). Note that Weckstrom does not indicate
which part of the text of Article 16(l)-the "using in the course of trade" or "goods or services"
language-creates this limitation.
102. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:77 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing European cases); Hazel Carty, Do Marks with a
Reputation Merit Special Protection?, 12 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 684, 685 (1997); Charles Gielen &
Benoit Strowel, The Benelux Trademark Act: A Guide to Trademark Law in Europe, 86 TRADEMARK
REP. 543, 563 & n.66 (1996); Robert Sumroy & Carina Badger, Infringing 'Use in the Course of Trade':
Trade Mark Use and the Essential Function of a Trade Mark, in TRADE MARK USE, supra note 73, at
163; David S. Welkowitz, Protection Against Trademark Dilution in the UK. and Canada: Inexorable
Trend or Will Tradition Triumph?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 63, 88 n.136 (2000).
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Directive does not require a trademark use of the mark for liability.'0 3 It is
unclear whether WTO panels or the Appellate Body will find that Article
16(1) requires a trademark use of the mark. As there is significant
disagreement on this issue, states that enact a trademark use requirement for
infringement liability will likely argue (1) that "using in the course of trade" is
ambiguous, and thus WTO panels and the Appellate Body should read the
obligation narrowly and defer to that state's decision to exempt nontrademark
uses of marks from liability,'0 4 and/or (2) that exempting nontrademark uses
of marks from trademark liability is a limited exception to trademark rights
justifiable under Article 17 of TRIPS.'
Because the phrase "using in the course of trade" at least means use of a
mark in "commercial activities" or "commercial use" of the mark, states could
impose a prima facie requirement of "using in the course of trade" or
"commercial use of a mark" for infringement actions (or an exemption for
''noncommercial use of mark") without violating their international trademark
obligations. Such a rule would protect speech interests and discourage
markholders from threatening to sue third parties who use their marks in
connection with political activities or social commentary. For example,
according to news reports, attorneys for a business that sells rings with
interchangeable stones under the registered mark "Change Rocks" sent a letter
to presidential candidate Barack Obama's political campaign suggesting it
must seek permission if it had plans to sell T-shirts or other campaign
memorabilia displaying the term "Change Rocks" in connection with a
concert and campaign fundraiser. 106 Trademark holders ranging from a
religious organization, 10 7 to a company offering hair restoration services 10 8 to
a shopping mall'09 have sued individuals who set up websites on the Internet
to complain or provide information about the markholders and their goods,
services, or activities. Today it is often unclear whether such trademark claims
are valid under national infringement laws that do not contain an explicit
commercial use requirement. Even if precedent suggests an accused infringer
would prevail, some third parties may stop using the mark due to the
uncertainty and expense of litigation."10
Categorical speech-protective trademark rules, like a commercial use
requirement for trademark liability, can provide more predictability in
trademark disputes and make it easier for judges to dispose of frivolous
trademark claims early."' Individuals and small companies may not be able to
afford to litigate through discovery to summary judgment or trial. It may also
be easier for defendants to recover sanctions for frivolous trademark claims
103. Case C-206/01, ArsenalFootball Club, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10273.
104. See infra Section III.C.
105. See infra Section II.C.
106. Julie Moran Alterio, Teen's, Obama 's Slogans Overlap, J. NEWS, Jan. 9, 2008, at Al.
107. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045 (10th
Cir. 2008).
108. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
109. Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003).
110. See McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 53 (explaining why
categorical safe harbors in trademark law can protect speech interests).
I 1l. Ramsey, supra note 5, at 454-57 (discussing the benefits of speech-protective trademark
rules).
2010] Free Speech and International Trademark Obligations 425
that ignore a rule explicitly allowing this use of the mark. 112 Expression is
more likely to be chilled and suppressed if litigants and judges are uncertain
about whether trademark law restricts this particular noncommercial use of a
mark. 1 3 Yet some speech-protective trademark rules may be overbroad and
permit certain uses of marks that are harmful to consumers. For example, one
problem with a commercial use requirement for infringement liability is that it
does not prohibit confusing use of the marks of nonprofit organizations in
noncommercial speech. Regardless of whether states believe the public
benefits overall from a commercial use requirement, they are permitted to
implement such a rule in their domestic trademark laws per the "using in the
course of trade" limitation in Article 16(1).
If a WTO member wants to permit infringement liability for some
noncommercial uses of marks outside "the course of trade," it could instead
more specifically exempt certain "nontrademark" uses of marks outside the
course of trade that express information or ideas-in other words,
noncommercial uses of a mark "otherwise than as a mark" or not as a
"designation of source." A domestic law exemption for noncommercial and
nontrademark uses of a mark would protect speech interests by discouraging
markholders from threatening to sue third parties who use marks without
authorization in the content of political speech, cybergripe websites, and other
types of noncommercial expression. At the same time, this more narrow
exemption would protect consumers against certain confusing uses of marks
"as marks" in noncommercial speech, such as use of a mark to impersonate
political or religious groups in a way that causes confusion about the source of
the third party's goods, services, or activities. 114
There is no explicit "commercial use" requirement in the federal
infringement statutes in the United States; 1 5 however, some courts have read
such a requirement into the law because of concerns regarding the
constitutionality of applying infringement law to noncommercial speech.' 
16
112. Id. at456&n.438.
113. Of course, fact-finders must still determine whether a particular use of a mark falls within
the scope of a law exempting noncommercial uses of a mark from liability, so speech-protective
trademark rules do not completely eliminate subjectivity or prevent bias from infecting the decision of
the fact-finder. Yet there is generally more predictability, and less discretion to err, when judges use
definitional balancing rather than ad hoc balancing. Id. at 453-57.
114. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement
by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1498557 (discussing when trademark infringement law should apply to the use
of marks to impersonate markholders and cause confusion about the source of expression). Many
nonprofit organizations identify and distinguish themselves and their goods, services, and activities
using a name or logo, which is protectable by U.S. trademark law if it is distinctive. Id. (manuscript at
16). Charitable organizations distribute or resell donated goods (such as food or clothing), churches
provide religious services, and political groups engage in voter registration and fundraising activities.
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(l)(a), 1125(a)(1) (2006). U.S. courts and commentators today agree the
phrase "use[s] in commerce" in both infringement statutes is jurisdictional-Congress may only regulate
"commerce" within its control-and thus the "in commerce" language does not create a "commercial
use" requirement for infringement liability. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672,
677 (9th Cir. 2005); United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92-93
(2d Cir. 1997); McCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25:57.
116. E.g., Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045,
1051-53 (10th Cir. 2008); Bosley, 403 F.3d at 676-77; Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775,
778 (6th Cir. 2003).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the test for identifying commercial
speech is not whether speech is sold for a profit, but whether it is "speech
which does no more than propose a commercial transaction."' 17 The United
States may argue that "using in the course of trade" or "commercial use" of a
mark is equivalent to use of a mark in "commercial speech," as that term is
defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, and thus the United States has discretion
to exempt uses of marks from trademark liability unless they fit within this
narrow definition. Some U.S. courts hold that the phrase "noncommercial use
of a mark" in the federal dilution statute is synonymous with use of a mark in
"noncommercial speech," and that mixed commercial/noncommercial speech
that is inextricably intertwined-such as a song sold for profit-is fully
protected by the First Amendment just like pure noncommercial speech.11 8 In
prior work, I have argued that use of another's mark in the content or titles of
films, books, or magazines, or displayed on the front of merchandise to
express information or ideas does not qualify as "pure commercial speech"
under U.S. constitutional law because it does more than "propose a
commercial transaction."'" 9 If Correa is correct that Article 16's "using in the
course of trade" language would "not control the use of trademarks, for
instance, in writings not intended to promote the sales of the trademarked
products and services, ' 120 this language could be read to justify an exemption
for uses of marks in noncommercial speech even if the expression is sold for
profit.
Other states may argue the phrase "using in the course of trade" includes
uses of marks in expression sold for a profit, especially merchandising sales,
and is broader than the U.S. concept of commercial speech. For example, the
European Court of Justice held the third-party sale of clothing bearing the
marks of the Arsenal sports team is use "in the course of trade" because it
"takes place in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic
advantage and not as a private matter." 121 Yet there is a significant distinction
from a free-speech perspective in the following uses of marks on goods sold
for profit: (1) use of a mark for shoes (such as "Nike") by a competitor to
falsely identify the source of its own shoes; (2) use of the marks of sports
teams and universities (such as "Chargers" or "USD") displayed on clothing
in a way that is visible to others; (3) use of another's marks in parody, satire,
criticism, and other commentary visibly displayed on clothing (such as the use
of Mutual of Omaha's marks-the variation "Mutant of Omaha" and a
shrunken image of its Indian head logo-in an anti-nuclear message on T-
shirts and other expressive merchandise); (4) use of another's marks in the
117. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74, 482 (1989); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying this definition of commercial
speech in a trademark case).
118. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904-07 (9th Cir. 2002).
119. Ramsey, supra note 5, at 395-404. Yet just because expression is constitutionally
protected does not mean that it cannot be regulated. A trademark infringement law regulating
noncommercial speech could survive constitutional scrutiny in the United States if it were narrowly
tailored and the government interest in regulating the speech was compelling. Id. at 444.
120. CORREA, supra note 1, at 186.
121. Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10273, 40.
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titles of literary or artistic works (such as the Dairy Queens film) and
advertisements for them; 122 and (5) use of another's marks in the content of
literary or artistic works (such as the fake "Michelob Oily" ad). 123 Interpreting
"using in the course of trade" to mean use of a mark in any expression sold for
profit could significantly harm speech interests if states were required to
protect against all such uses of marks. The term "using in the course of trade"
is ambiguous. It is not clear whether it refers to the use of a mark only in pure
commercial speech, all speech sold for profit, or something in between. As
discussed later in Section III.C, states should have discretion to determine
whether trademark or free speech rights should prevail when the terms of the
international trademark agreements are ambiguous.'24
In sum, the limitation of "using in the course of trade" in Article 16(1)
permits national legislatures to increase protection of speech in their
trademark laws by enacting a statutory "commercial use" requirement for
trademark infringement liability, and allows national courts to refuse to apply
infringement law to noncommercial uses of marks. WTO members may also
be able to justify an exception from trademark liability for noncommercial
expression under Article 17 or other elements of Article 16(1), which requires
the signs and goods or services to be identical or similar, and the use of the
mark to cause a likelihood of confusion.
c. Signs and Goods/Services Must Be Identical or Similar
Additional limitations in Article 16(1) of TRIPS relate to the signs and
the goods or services of the parties. For the exclusive right in Article 16(1) to
apply: (1) the signs used by the third party and markholder must be "identical
or similar," (2) the sign must be used by the third party "for goods or
services," and (3) those goods or services must be "identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered."' 125 Members therefore
need not protect against allegedly confusing uses of dissimilar marks. For
example, national courts need not protect the mark "Apple" for computers
against use of the dissimilar mark "Dell" for computers.
In addition, if the third party is not using the sign for goods or services,
this use-even if confusing-is outside the scope of TRIPS Article 16(1). The
confusing use of similar or identical signs with dissimilar goods or services is
also not covered by Article 16(1), although Article 16(3) may apply if the
mark is well-known, as discussed later. 126An example may clarify this
limitation. If a mark, such as "Toyota," is registered only for automobiles, and
a third party is using the mark on the Internet or on T-shirts to criticize the
markholder and its products, this third party's use of the sign would fall
outside the obligations of Article 16(1) because the sign is not used for goods
122. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398-403 (Sth Cit. 1987); Am. Dairy
Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).
123. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). See generally
Ramsey, supra note 5, at 395-404 (discussing how U.S. courts should classify these uses of marks under
the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine).
124. See infra Section III.C.
125. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
126. See infra Subsection II.B.3.
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or services "identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is
registered"-here, automobiles. A third party may be providing information
services when it uses another's mark on the Internet, but these services are not
identical or similar to the goods or services of the markholder in this example.
On the other hand, if the Toyota mark is also registered for information
services (such as the dissemination of information about the automobile
industry on the Internet) or goods (such as T-shirts and other expressive
merchandise), and the third party is displaying the mark in connection with
identical or similar services or goods, this particular element of Article 16(1)
is satisfied. Importantly, Article 16(1) provides that likelihood of confusion is
presumed if the third party uses "an identical sign for identical goods or
services.
' ' 2 7
Free speech will be better protected in national trademark laws if
members construe the terms "identical or similar" and "goods or services"
narrowly when implementing their obligations in trademark statutes and the
common law. Moreover, states may want to consider whether they should
permit firms who primarily sell noninformational goods or services to register
their marks for information services. 128 News reporters, cybergripers, and
other commentators and critics often use the identical sign of the markholder
when they provide information about the markholder. Markholders who want
to take advantage of the likelihood of confusion presumption will have an
incentive to register their marks for information services. If they do this and
then sue for infringement based on unauthorized use of the mark in this
commentary or criticism, the free flow of information could be harmed, as
individuals accused of infringement will often not have the funds to litigate
and rebut a presumption of likelihood of confusion.
d. A Likelihood of Confusion
Finally, only unauthorized uses of protected marks that result in "a
likelihood of confusion" are covered by Article 16(1). TRIPS does not require
members to protect against uses of a mark that only might cause some
confusion, 129 although, as noted previously, a likelihood of confusion must be
presumed in cases involving "use of an identical sign for identical goods or
services." 1
30
TRIPS does not define the phrase "a likelihood of confusion," so it is
unclear whether Article 16(1) requires members to only protect against "core"
or more traditional types of confusion, such as confusion about the source of
goods or services. Interpreted broadly, this phrase could require members to
protect markholders against unauthorized uses of marks that cause confusion
regarding the markholder's affiliation with or sponsorship of a third party or
its products, initial interest confusion, post sale confusion, or reverse
127. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
128. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office permits such registrations if the mark is being used
to identify the source of information services, and not just advertise the underlying goods or services.
See Ramsey, supra note 114, at 18.
129. CORREA, supra note 1, at 186.
130. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
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confusion, among other types of confusion. 13 1 If national trademark laws
prohibit such uses of a mark where there is no confusion about source or
quality, and thereby provide property-like protection for trademarks, this
could seriously harm free expression, especially when a markholder is suing
to stop unauthorized use of its marks to convey information or ideas. Given
the discord among legislatures, courts, and scholars about what type of
confusion is covered by the phrase "a likelihood of confusion," and the
potential harm to free speech values if this phrase is interpreted broadly, states
should have sufficient flexibility to interpret this ambiguous obligation in
Article 16(1) narrowly and only protect marks against traditional infringement
harms. 1
32
One interesting issue is whether WTO members can use the "likelihood
of confusion" limitation to take free speech values into account-or put a
"thumb on the scale" on the side of free speech-in trademark disputes
involving the unauthorized use of marks in expression. For example, a
national court may hold that a particular use of another's mark is not likely to
be confusing under trademark infringement law because it communicates
ideas, or a humorous joke or pun, rather than information about the source of
the goods or services. 133 Such a case-by-case interpretation of national
infringement law clearly complies with Article 16(1) because members are
only required to prevent uses of a mark that cause "a likelihood of confusion."
The more difficult question is whether domestic legislatures and courts can
cite the "likelihood of confusion" limitation in TRIPS Article 16(1) to
categorically exempt certain "expressive" uses of marks, such as comparative
advertising or parody, from the scope of trademark infringement liability.
Certain uses of another's mark may generally be unlikely to cause confusion
or other significant social harms. Yet if certain expressive uses of registered
trademarks in the course of trade for identical or similar goods/services do
cause confusion, but are categorically exempted from trademark infringement
liability, that state's laws may be found inconsistent with Article 16(1). A
state may have an easier time justifying this type of categorical speech-
protective trademark law under Article 17.
3. Trademark Rights in Well-Known Marks
Well-known marks are entitled to a distinct type of trademark protection
pursuant to the Paris Convention and TRIPS. Examples of well-known marks
include "Kodak," "Coca-Cola," "Sony," "Cartier," "Marlboro,"' 134 the marks
131. For a discussion of when confusion is material in trademark infringement disputes, see
Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REv. 413,427-46 (2010).
132. Cf CORREA, supra note 1, at 186 ("The meaning of 'confusion' should be understood in
the light of Article 15.1; that is, in relation to the capacity of a trademark to distinguish identical or
similar goods or services of one undertaking from those of another."); see infra Section II1.C.
133. E.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260-62 (4th
Cir. 2007) (finding no likelihood of confusion because "the 'Chewy Vuiton' dog toys are successful
parodies").
134. MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-2; see also Xuemin Chen, China, in FAMOUS AND WELL-
KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 4-127, 4-145; Charles Gielen,
Benelux, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 4-61,
4-71; Peter Dirk Siemsen, Brazil, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL
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"Bimbo" and "Cemex" in Mexico, 135 and Proctor & Gamble's mark
"Safeguard" in China.136 Article 6bis(1) of the Paris Convention provides that
members must prohibit registration and use "of a trademark which constitutes
a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a
mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or
use to be well-known in that country as being already the mark of a person
entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar
goods.' 37 This doctrine was developed "to provide owners of marks, which
were widely known in the marketplace but not registered, with a measure of
protection against later registrations of the same mark by others."'13  Such a
rule is especially important in states where registration of a mark is normally
required for protection, but it has also been applied in some states to
circumstances where a mark is neither registered nor used, but has acquired a
well-known reputation in that state. 139 Thus, unlike in TRIPS Article 16(1),
marks can be protected in the absence of registration under Paris Convention
Article 6bis if they are well-known in the state in which protection is
sought. 1
40
TRIPS creates additional obligations relating to well-known marks in the
last two sections of Article 16.141 Article 16(2) extends the protection in Paris
Convention Article 6bis to services; the text of Article 6bis only refers to
goods. It also provides some clarification on when a mark is deemed to be
"well-known": "In determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members
shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of
the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been
obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark."' 142 The "relevant
sector of the public" could include both the plaintiff's and the defendant's
customers and potential customers.' 43 Thus, even if McDonald's has not yet
registered its marks or expanded its hamburger franchise into South Africa,
advertising or other promotion of the marks in that state may make it more
ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 4-81, 4-86.
135. Martin Michaus, Mexico, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNowN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 4-273.
136. Chen, supra note 134, at 4-127, 4-140 to -142.
137. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6bis(l).
138. MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-26; see CORREA, supra note 1, at 188-93; GERVAIS, supra
note 1, at 275-78.
139. MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-26, 1-33 to -35. A markholder may be able to prove it has a
well-known reputation with evidence of spillover advertising and survey evidence. Id. at 1-35 to -44. In
the United States, appellate courts disagree about whether federal trademark law requires use of a well-
known mark in the United States for protection. Compare Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.,
391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that reputation without use can be the basis of a claim for federal
trademark infringement), with ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to
apply the reputation-without-use doctrine under federal trademark law). See also David W. Ehrlich &
Ronald J. Lehrman, United States, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 18, at 4-467, 4-484 to -486, which discusses the "reputation-without-use" doctrine
in the United States.
140. MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-33. In Brazil, it is not necessary to have the mark registered
or used in Brazil-mere registration anywhere suffices under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.
Siemsen, supra note 134, at 4-81, 4-97.
141. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(2)-(3).
142. Id. art. 16(2).
143. MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-39.
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likely the McDonald's marks will be deemed "well-known" to the relevant
public and enable McDonald's to prevent third parties from registering or
using its marks in that state for identical or similar goods or services.144
These obligations to protect well-known marks in Paris Convention
Article 6bis and TRIPS Article 16(2) are limited in certain ways-a WTO
member need only offer infringement protection to well-known marks where:
(1) the mark is well-known in the state where protection is sought; (2) the
third party's mark is "a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an
imitation, or a translation" of the well-known mark-this language may
require more identity between the marks than Article 16(1) (which requires
infringement protection if the marks are identical or similar); (3) the third
party's mark is "liable to create confusion" with the well-known mark-this
language may require a stronger showing of confusion than Article 16(1)
(which requires a "likelihood of confusion"); (4) the third party is using the
mark for goods or services; and (5) the goods or services of the parties are
identical or similar. 145 If any of these elements are not satisfied, Paris
Convention Article 6bis and/or TRIPS Article 16(2) do not apply. To protect
speech interests, states can cite these limitations on the scope of their
international obligations to justify denying infringement protection to
unregistered well-known marks unless the third party's mark is virtually
identical, the goods or services are identical or similar, and/or there is
evidence of actual confusion or a stronger showing of likelihood of confusion.
TRIPS also creates obligations relating to well-known marks used by
third parties in connection with the sale of dissimilar goods or services that
suggest a "connection" with the markholder and are likely to damage its
interests. An example would be unauthorized use of the "Kodak" mark for
bicycles. 146 TRIPS Article 16(3) provides that Paris Convention Article 6bis
now applies "to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of
which a trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation
to those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or
services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the
interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by
such use. 147 As Article 16(3) applies to noncompeting goods or services, it
requires states to provide stronger trademark protection across industries to
well-known marks.
While TRIPS Article 16(3) extends the obligations in Paris Convention
Article 6bis so that they now apply to goods or services which are not similar,
it does contain some limitations on trademark rights which enable states to
protect speech interests. States need only provide this strong form of
protection when, in addition to the first four limitations ((1) through (4)) listed
above for TRIPS Article 16(2) and Paris Convention Article 6bis, the
144. McDonald's Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty.) Ltd. 1997 (1) SA 1 (A) at 35
(S. Aft.) (holding that "a mark is well-known in the Republic if it is well-known to persons interested in
the goods or services to which the mark relates"); see MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-11, 1-36 to -41.
145. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(2); Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 6bis(l).
146. See MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-75 to -127 (discussing protection of well-known marks
on noncompeting goods).
147. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 16(3).
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following elements are satisfied: (5) the third party's use of the mark indicates
a connection between its goods or services and the markholder; (6) this use is
likely to damage the markholder's interests; and (7) the markholder has
"registered" the well-known mark in at least one WTO member state.148
TRIPS Article 16 only sets forth minimum standards of protection, so
member states may elect to offer greater protection for well-known marks
regardless of whether the mark is registered or use of the mark causes
confusion, indicates a connection between the third party and markholder, or
is likely to cause damage to the markholder. 1 They can offer strong
trademark protection against "dilution" of well-known marks.' Yet there is
disagreement on whether TRIPS Article 16(3) requires anti-dilution protection
of well-known marks. 51 Some WTO members, such as Australia, interpret the
TRIPS Article 16(3) obligations more narrowly and do not confer a broad
anti-dilution right on the holders of well-known marks. 152 Such states may
claim they comply with their obligations in their infringement laws by
protecting against confusing uses of well-known marks on dissimilar or
"unrelated" goods or services.153
A few years after TRIPS became effective, representatives of the United
States and other WTO members who wanted stronger anti-dilution protection
for well-known marks sought to clarify the meaning of TRIPS Article 16(3) in
another forum: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The
WIPO membership significantly overlaps with, but is not identical to, the
WTO membership. 54 In 1999, the General Assembly of the WIPO and the
Members of the Assembly of the Paris Union for Industrial Property (Paris
Union) adopted the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks. 155 According to the Preface, "[t]he
148. Id.; see MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-75 (noting registration of a well-known mark is a
condition of Article 16(3)). "Although the rationale for the reference to Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention is unclear, the limitation of Article 16.3 to registered trademarks cannot be seen, in the light
of the interpretive principles of the Vienna Convention, just as a drafting mistake." CORREA, supra note
1, at 192-93.
149. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
150. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (U.S. federal dilution statute). According to Mostert, an
action for trademark dilution has also been recognized in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and
Spain, among other states. MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-97.
151. Compare Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony Possible in
the Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 130 (1996) (arguing that dilution is a requirement), and
141 CONG. REc. 19310 (Dec. 19, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (arguing that the need for
dilution protection to meet the United States's obligations under TRIPS is one reason Congress should
enact the Federal Trademark Dilution Act), with Heald, supra note 73, at 642-44, 654-55 (arguing that
dilution is not a requirement). In his treatise, Mostert notes that this provision "will probably serve as a
basis for legal action founded on a likelihood of confusion of business connection or sponsorship," but
that "[i]t is also possible that this provision will form the grounds, where appropriate, of an action of
trademark dilution in the absence of any confusion but where some association of the well-known mark
with the goods or services of the registered owner is present." MOSTERT, supra note 18, at 1-76.
152. Shanahan & Freeman, supra note 43, at 4-29, 4-34, 4-35 (discussing Australian law).
153. E.g., Trade Marks Act, 1995, § 120(3) (Austl.), discussed in Shanahan & Freeman, supra
note 43, at 4-39 (noting that Australia has no law of dilution but that Section 120(3) provides protection
for "unrelated" goods or services where the mark is well-known).
154. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States, http://www.wipo.int/
members/en (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing 184 WIPO members); World Trade Organization,
Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTOe/whatis-e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2010) (listing 153 WTO members as of July 23, 2008).
155. See WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
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Recommendation is the first implementation of WIPO's policy to adapt to the
pace of change in the field of industrial property by considering new options
for accelerating the development of international harmonized common
principles."'
156
Among other things, the Joint Recommendation states that members
"shall protect a well-known mark against conflicting marks"'157 and provides
in Article 4(1)(b) that a "mark shall be deemed to be in conflict with a well-
known mark" even for dissimilar goods or services "where at least one of the
following conditions is filled": (i) "the use of that mark would indicate a
connection between the goods and/or services for which the mark is used, is
the subject of an application for registration, or is registered, and the owner of
the well-known mark, and would be likely to damage his interests," (ii) "the
use of that mark is likely to impair or dilute in an unfair manner the distinctive
character of the well-known mark," and/or (iii) "the use of that mark would
take unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the well-known mark.'
15 8
The first subpart, (i), is similar to the language of TRIPS Article 16(3),
although it does not require the well-known mark to be registered for
protection. 159 The last two subparts, (ii) and (iii), require states to protect
against "dilut[ion]" and "tak[ing] unfair advantage" of the distinctive
character of a well-known mark regardless of whether this use of the mark
indicates a connection with the markholder or is likely to damage the interests
of the markholder. 160 With the addition of these last two subparts, Article
4(1)(b) of "the Joint Recommendation explicitly requires dilution protection
for well-known marks, and does so in language that goes beyond Article 16(3)
of TRIPS."' 6'
This interpretation of TRIPS Article 16(3) in the Joint Recommendation
of Well-Known Marks does not by itself bind the WTO members. 162 Some
commentators refer to this nonbinding resolution as "soft law,"' 6 3 although it
is not really "law" in any traditional sense because it does not create any
binding legal obligation. Representatives of the WIPO say that states are
"under a moral obligation" to comply with the Joint Recommendation, but,
unlike in the WTO, the WIPO has no dispute settlement mechanism to
encourage compliance. 164 Moreover, several members refused to join the
recommendation with regard to the provisions requiring protection of dilution,
including Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of
Korea, Spain, and Uruguay. 165 During the meetings regarding the Joint
Known Marks, art. 4, WIPO Pub. 833(E) (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/developmentciplaw/pub833.htm.
156. Id. preface.
157. Id. art. 3(1).
158. Id. art. 4(1)(b)(i)-(iii).
159. Id. art. 4(1)(b)(i).
160. Id. art. 4(1)(b)(ii)-(iii).
161. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 2 1, at 211.
162. Id. at 210.
163. E.g., CORREA, supra note 1, at 191.
164. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 2 l, at 210.
165. WIPO, Joint Resolution Concerning Provision on the Protection of Well-known Marks:
Memorandum by the Director General, 8, WIPO Doc. A/34/13 (Aug. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a-34/a-34-13.pdf. Note that some documents and
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Recommendation, Argentina pointed out the problems with drafting such a
nonbinding joint resolution; it noted the Joint Recommendation creates legal
insecurity about a member's international obligations and creates "de facto
norms" without "the permanent transparency of the negotiation and decision-
making processes." 1  WTO panels and the Appellate Body may consider
these nonbinding norms when interpreting the obligations in TRIPS. 167 Yet
they should not be determinative. As noted by Graeme Dinwoodie and
Rochelle Dreyfuss, the refusal of several WTO members to join this portion of
the Joint Recommendation means that the Joint Recommendation "does not
shed light on the issue" of whether TRIPS requires dilution protection.1
68
After the Joint Recommendation was drafted, the United States and
other states entered into subsequent binding free trade agreements that
adopted the interpretation of TRIPS Article 16(3) set forth in the Joint
Recommendation. 69 For example, in 2003 the United States entered into a
bilateral free trade agreement with Singapore which provides that both states
shall give effect to Articles 1 through 6 of the Joint Recommendation.
°70
States that enter into such bilateral agreements are bound to follow the Joint
Recommendation's broad interpretation of TRIPS Article 16(3) which
requires dilution protection. As a result of these agreements, it is now more
difficult for states such as the United States to take the position that Article
16(3) is more limited than the Joint Recommendation suggests. These bilateral
agreements would not be enforceable in the WTO dispute settlement system,
but WTO jurists may hold that states who are parties to such agreements are
estopped from denying the position they took in these agreements.
Per the customary rules of treaty interpretation, which are relevant in
WTO disputes, subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the
interpretation of treaty provisions should be taken into account when WTO
panels and the Appellate Body determine the meaning of the language. 171 If a
subsequent agreement is concluded only between a subset of the parties,
commentators refer to the "Joint Recommendation" as the "Joint Resolution." Id.
166. WIPO, General Report of the Thirty-Fourth Series of Meetings, 178, WIPO Doc.
A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999), discussed in DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 206; and Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
993, 1003 (2002).
167. They have done this in the past. E.g., Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the
US Copyright Act, 6.67-.70, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter US-Section 110(5)] (taking
into account the WIPO Copyright Treaty, which was not yet in force); Heifer, Toward a Human Rights
Framework, supra note 6, at 1000; Peter K. Yu, Challenges to the Development of a Human-Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 77, 92.
168. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property
System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1187, 1228 (2009); see
also CORREA, supra note 1, at 191 (noting the Joint Recommendation "substantially expands the concept
of well-known trademarks, beyond the boundaries of the TRIPS Agreement").
169. See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 210; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and
Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 885, 927 (2004).
170. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.1(2)(b)(i), May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset-upload- fle708 4036.pdf,
discussed in CORREA, supra note 1, at 192 & n.78; and DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 21, at 210. The
Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Chile includes different language; the parties
agreed to "recognize[] the importance" of the Joint Recommendation and be guided by its principles.
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.2(9), June 6, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/assetupload file912_4011 .pdf.
171. See infra Subsection III.B.2.
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however, their interpretation should not be adopted if it affects the rights or
obligations of other WTO members who objected to that interpretation and/or
who were not a party to the subsequent agreement. 172 The Joint
Recommendation's expansive interpretation of the well-known marks
provision would increase the scope of the parties' trademark obligations
beyond that required by the text of TRIPS Article 16(3). As some WTO
members objected to this interpretation and only a few parties are members of
the binding bilateral free trade agreements that adopt it, the Joint
Recommendation does not provide guidance to WTO jurists on the issue of
whether TRIPS requires dilution protection. 1
73
Article 16(3) is ambiguous on this point, and thus members have
flexibility in how they implement their obligations to protect well-known
marks for the reasons discussed later in Section III.C. States such as Australia
can protect well-known marks in infringement laws without offering dilution
protection to markholders, 174 while the United States can enact a strong
dilution statute with exceptions for certain types of noncommercial and
nontrademark uses of marks.1 75 Until there is a consensus among more of the
WTO members on the proper interpretation of TRIPS Article 16(3), free
speech will be better protected, international obligations will be more clear,
and national sovereignty will be properly respected, if the obligations to
protect trademarks in Article 16(3) are interpreted narrowly for all of the
members and limited to those obligations expressly set forth in the text of that
provision. States can still protect against dilution, but they are not obligated to
do so by the Paris Convention or TRIPS.
4. Strategic Reasons To Argue That Certain Unauthorized Uses
of a Mark Fall Outside the Scope of Trademark Rights
In a WTO dispute, the burden of proof is normally on the complainant if
the issue is the existence of a TRIPS Article 16 violation,176 while the burden
is on the respondent for a determination of whether Article 17 permits an
exception to the rights conferred by a trademark. 177 If the treaty terms are
ambiguous, or if evidence is difficult to obtain, the state with the burden of
proof may have a difficult time persuading a WTO panel or the Appellate
Body that it should prevail. For states accused of violating their international
trademark obligations, the different placement of the burden of proof is a
significant advantage to conceptualizing certain uses of a mark as outside the
scope of trademark rights in TRIPS Article 16, rather than as a "limited
exception" or "defense" to trademark rights permitted under TRIPS Article
17. It is therefore important to consider whether there is a colorable argument
that this contested use of a trademark is outside the scope of rights conferred
by a trademark. Free speech values are better served if the burden of proof can
172. Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts,
102 AM. J. INT'L L. 421, 472 (2008).
173. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 168, at 1228.
174. Trade Marks Act, 1995, § 120(3) (Austl.).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)-(3) (2006).
176. EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.540.
177. See, e.g., id. 7.645.
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reasonably be placed on the state seeking to force another WTO member to
protect trademark rights at the expense of speech interests. 1
78
C. Limited Exceptions to Trademark Rights
Article 17 of TRIPS provides states with additional discretion to
implement speech-protective trademark laws. Article 17 states in full:
"Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a
trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions
take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of
third parties."' 79 Article 17 "presupposes that a certain degree of likelihood of
confusion can be permitted,"'180 so states may create affirmative defenses that
are only relevant after a finding of likelihood of confusion and still satisfy
their obligations under TRIPS.'81 States cannot allow compulsory licensing of
trademarks-that is expressly prohibited by TRIPS Article 21 182 -but they
can refuse to prohibit or punish certain uses of a mark under Article 17.
Compared to the exception provisions in TRIPS relating to copyright
(Article 13) and patent rights (Article 30), it is a lot easier for WTO members
to create exceptions to trademark rights under Article 17.183 The copyright
provision, Article 13, is entitled "Limitations and Exceptions" and provides
"[m]embers shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder."' 84 Article 30 sets forth "Exceptions to Rights Conferred" by a patent
and states that "[m]embers may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties."'
185
As noted by the WTO panel in European Communities-Protection of
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs (EC-G1), "unlike these other provisions, Article 17 contains no
reference to 'conflict with a [or the] normal exploitation' [of the work or
patent], no reference to 'unreasonabl[e] prejudice' to the 'legitimate interests'
of the right holder or owner, and it not only refers to the legitimate interests of
third parties but treats them on par with those of the right holder." 186
178. Courts in the United States place the burden of proof on the government or party who is
seeking to restrict expression. See, e.g., Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
179. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 17.
180. EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.670; see CORREA, supra note 1, at 193-95.
181. Cf KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)
(holding that the doctrine of descriptive fair use can apply even after a finding of likelihood of
confusion).
182. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 21.
183. Even so, scholars have emphasized there are also inherent flexibilities in the patent and
copyright provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. See supra note 57.
184. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13; see US-Section 110(5), supra note 167.
185. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30; see Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DSI 14/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Patent Protection].
186. EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.649.
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Moreover, because "Article 17 requires only that exceptions 'take account' of
the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark, and does not refer to
'unreasonabl[e] prejudice' to those interests," this "suggests a lesser standard
of regard for the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark is
required." 187 These differences between Article 17 and the copyright and
patent exception provisions are important, and show the WTO members were
willing to allow states to have more discretion to create exceptions to
trademark rights than in copyright and patent law.
It is clear from the text of Article 17 that states may allow "fair use of
descriptive terms,"'188 but WTO members are not restricted to this particular
exception; they may enact other limited exceptions to trademark rights. As
discussed below, Article 17 requires a state to satisfy two elements: (1) the
exception must be limited; and (2) the exception must take into account the
legitimate interests of both the trademark holder and third parties. 89 As noted
previously, the burden of proving both elements is on the respondent, or the
state that created a limited exception to trademark rights within its borders.19
0
1. The Exception Must Be Limited
According to the WTO panel in the EC-GI dispute, a "limited
exception" is narrow and permits only a small diminution of the rights
conferred by a trademark. 191 The exception must be examined on a "per right"
basis. 192 Among other things, "an exception could curtail the right of the
owner in respect of the third parties concerned, or with respect to the identity
or the similarity of the signs or the goods or services concerned or with
respect to the degree of likelihood of confusion, or some combination of
these."' 93 Importantly, an exception may qualify as "limited" even if it is not
limited in all of these ways.'
94
In the EC-GI dispute, the panel found the European Union's
geographical indication regulations allowing certain unauthorized uses of
language claimed as a trademark to be a limited exception to trademark rights
where the trademarked phrase consisted of a protected geographical indication
(GI). 195 According to the panel, the exception was limited for a variety of
reasons. First, the trademark "may continue to be used" by the markholder
even if covered by the EU regulations.' 96 Second, "the trademark owner's
187. Id. 7.671.
188. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 17; see also CORREA, supra note 1, at 195; GERVAIS, supra note
1, at 280. This defense is included in the trademark laws of the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4)
(2006), and Europe, Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95, art. 6(1), 2008 O.J. (L299) 25, 29
(EC).The European Court of Justice has heard cases involving unauthorized uses of marks to describe
the purpose of a compatible product, e.g., Case C-228/03, Gillette Co. v. LA-Labs. Ltd., 2005 E.C.R. I-
2337, and in comparative advertising to refer to a competing product, e.g., Case C-487/07, L'Oreal SA
v. Bellure NV (Dec. 1, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu.






195. Id. M1 7.655-.661.
196. Id. 17.659.
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right to prevent confusing uses is unaffected, except with respect to the use of
a GI as entered in the GI register in accordance with its registration"-only
registered GIs (and not their "linguistic versions" or translations) are covered
by the EU regulations. 197 Third, the panel also thought it was important that
the exception to trademark rights in the EU regulations "will not apply"-the
GI would not be allowed to co-exist with the preexisting trademark-in
circumstances "where the likelihood of confusion is relatively high."'198 WTO
panels or the Appellate Body may use a similar analysis when states allow
certain unauthorized uses of marks to protect the right to freedom of
expression.
Article 17 allows WTO members to enact a variety of limited
exemptions and defenses to trademark rights to protect speech interests. An
exemption for noncommercial uses of marks is already permissible under
Article 16(l)'s "using in the course of trade" limitation, but it would also be
permissible under Article 17 because it is narrow and does not harm a
markholder's rights with regard to commercial uses of its marks. Members
could also implement an exemption for all nontrademark uses of marks, and
limit application of trademark law to unauthorized use of a trademark "as a
mark" or "designation of source." Alternatively, states could enact specific
exceptions for the nontrademark use of marks in political speech, news
reporting, literary and artistic works, parody, satire, criticism, and other
commentary. Other permissible limitations include an exception for
comparative advertising and other nominative fair uses of a mark in
commercial speech, such as use of the mark to refer to the markholder or
describe the goods or services of those who resell or repair its trademarked
products. States may also exempt nontrademark use of a mark in commercial
parodies or satire displayed on the front of T-shirts or other expressive
merchandise sold for profit. Such uses of trademarks are generally unlikely to
result in a likelihood of confusion regarding the source of the third party's
goods or services. These provisions could be characterized in national
trademark laws as exemptions or exclusions from the scope of trademark
liability, or as affirmative defenses.'
99
These exceptions are narrow and not unlimited because they would not
apply to all third parties, all signs, all goods and services, and all uses of a
mark likely to cause confusion or indicate a connection with a well-known
mark. If a state permitted such uses of a mark either categorically or on a case-
by-case basis, markholders would still have the right to sue competitors and
other third parties who used their registered marks as a designation of source
in the course of trade on similar goods or services in ways that cause a
likelihood of confusion, or that indicate a connection with a well-known mark
in a manner likely to damage the markholder's interests. These exceptions will
197. Id.
198. Id. 7.670; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 14:1.50 (discussing this WTO
dispute).
199. See MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 229-33, 260-343 (2d ed. 2009)
(discussing exceptions and defenses in U.S. trademark law, and First Amendment analysis by courts);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 101,
108-12 (2009) (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of characterizing exceptions as affirmative
defenses).
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likely only cause a small diminution in the markholder's rights unless they are
interpreted broadly by national courts. Thus, these types of speech-protective
uses of marks should be deemed limited exceptions under the first prong of
Article 17.
2. The Legitimate Interests of the Markholder and of Third
Parties
Even if an exception is limited, it must also satisfy the requirement that
"such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the
trademark and of third parties" in order for Article 17 to exempt a WTO
member from its obligations to protect rights conferred by a trademark. 00 The
phrase "legitimate interests" is not defined in TRIPS. It was interpreted by the
WTO panel in the EC-GI dispute "as a normative claim calling for protection
of interests that are 'justifiable' in the sense that they are supported by
relevant public policies or other social norms.",20 The phrase is not equivalent
to the "legal rights" of the markholder or third parties.20 2 As "nothing in the
text of Article 17 indicates that a case-by-case analysis is a requirement under
the TRIPS Agreement, ' '203 a categorical rule allowing a particular type of use
of a mark (such as comparative advertising or parody) may sufficiently take
into account the legitimate interests of trademark holders and third parties and
satisfy Article 17.
a. The Markholder's Legitimate Interests
In disputes involving a conflict between trademark and free speech
rights, there are certain "legitimate interests" of a markholder that are
justifiable and supported by relevant public policies and other social norms.
As noted by the EC-GI panel:
Every trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the distinctiveness, or
capacity to distinguish, of its trademark so that it can perform that function. This includes
its interest in using its own trademark in connection with the relevant goods and services
of its own and authorized undertakings. Taking account of that legitimate interest will
also take account of the trademark owner's interest in the economic value of its mark
arising from the reputation that it enjoys and the quality that it denotes. 204
Even if certain unauthorized uses of a mark could harm its distinctiveness, this
is not "fatal to the applicability of Article 17 given that, as a provision
permitting an exception to the exclusive right to prevent uses that would result
in a likelihood of confusion, it presupposes that a certain degree of likelihood
of confusion can be permitted."
If a state presents evidence, such as a survey or report, that shows its
limited exception would generally not result in a likelihood of confusion, it
200. EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.662.
201. Id. 7.663.
202. Id. 7.662.
203. Id. 1 7.672.
204. Id. 7.664.
205. Id. 7.670.
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may be more likely to convince a WTO panel or the Appellate Body that its
law takes account of the legitimate interests of markholders.2 °6 A survey could
also be used to establish that certain uses of well-known marks do not indicate
a connection between the goods or services of the markholder and third
parties. Experts may testify that this type of use of a mark is not likely to
damage the legitimate interests of markholders. If there is no likelihood of
confusion or other harm to the markholder caused by third-party use of the
mark in this way, then the legitimate interests of the markholder are taken into
account by an exception allowing this expression.
Where a limited exception does create some confusion or does harm the
distinctiveness of a mark, markholders may have a legitimate interest in
preventing these harms that justifies protection of their trademark rights. Yet
that does not mean Article 17 is not satisfied, as the legitimate interests of
third parties are also relevant and, unlike with the copyright and patent
provisions, are treated "on par with those of the right holder.' ' 207 Even if
markholders are deemed to have property interests in their marks, WTO
panels and the Appellate Body must balance the markholder's interests against
the interests of third parties when determining if Article 17 permits this
exception to trademark rights.
b. The Legitimate Interests of Third Parties
TRIPS Article 17 is equally concerned with the legitimate interests of
third parties. Relevant third parties could include trademark licensees,
competitors of the trademark holder, the person or firm using the
mark without authorization, 208 consumers or potential consumers of the
markholder's goods or services, and the rest of the general public. Each of
these parties may have different interests that are legitimate.
Trademark licensees, consumers, and legitimate competitors have
interests aligned with the trademark holder in 2,reventing consumer confusion
resulting from confusing uses of marks. 209 Trademark licensees want
consumers to be able to identify their products by brand name in the
marketplace. As noted by the WTO panel in EC-GI, "[c]onsumers have a
legitimate interest in being able to distinguish the goods and services of one
undertaking from those of another, and to avoid confusion." 210 Consumers
generally benefit if they can rely on trademarks to identify and distinguish the
source and quality of goods or services in the marketplace. Trademarks can
reduce consumer search costs. Protection of trademarks may encourage the
continued production by firms of quality products once they realize they will
enjoy the benefits of a good reputation. Competitors of the markholder also
have an interest in not having third parties use a confusing mark, as the
infringer may be stealing customers that were not willing to pay the
206. Id. 7.674.
207. Id. 7.649.
208. Cf id. 7.681 (agreeing that "third parties" includes "persons using a GI in accordance
with a GI registration" that consists of another's mark).
209. See id. 7.676, 7.680.
210. Id. 7.676.
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markholder's prices but are willing to pay the competitors' prices. Reasonable
people may disagree on what scope of trademark protection is appropriate, but
surely most people would agree social welfare increases when states provide
at least some protection against confusing uses of trademarks.
Yet there is another legitimate interest of third parties that must be
considered in trademark disputes: the right to freedom of expression.2 1' When
trademark laws regulate uses of marks in expression, they implicate the right
to freedom of expression. 21 2 This right is recognized in human rights treaties,
which are relevant when WTO panels and the Appellate Body interpret the
meaning of Article 17 and the other provisions of TRIPS.213 Furthermore, as
discussed in the introduction to this Part, the right of free speech is protected
in various national constitutions, statutes, and court decisions.
WTO members may protect speech from government restriction for a
number of reasons. The two main theories used to justify protection of the
right to freedom of expression include the marketplace of ideas metaphor and
the democratic self-government paradigm. 214 Those that support the former
theory believe the discovery of truth will be served by a robust marketplace of
ideas. Citizens can communicate and listen to a variety of ideas. Different
ideas are allowed to compete for acceptance within the community based on
their merits, not on whether the government approves of their content or
viewpoint. While this theory is both over- and underinclusive, and it can be
difficult to define what qualifies as "expression" and determine the scope of
protection for certain types of expression, free speech laws that embrace this
theory help facilitate the exchange of ideas and information.215
As freedom of expression is essential in a democratic society, some
argue the main focus of free speech theory should instead be on its ability to
facilitate democratic self-government by generating open discussion on
matters of public concern.2 1 This theory links the free speech right to free and
open democratic deliberation and tolerates more government regulations of
speech, including laws that make it easier for minority groups or the poor to
express themselves. It also provides a better rationale for protecting speech
relating to politics or self-governance over other important values, yet it is
underinclusive due to its focus on protecting speech that assists the
community in deciding who should govern and what rules should apply to the
217
community.
211. Cf Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Learning To Live
Together, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 3, 18 ("[T]he third step [in the copyright three-step test] was
interpreted [by the WTO panel in US-Section 110(5)] as allowing public interest considerations (i.e.,
what constitutes an allowable 'justification' for the exception), and human rights principles might thus
inform the determination of the proper scope of exceptions."); Netanel, supra note 57, at 475 (arguing in
the copyright context that VTO jurists should consider the right to freedom of expression when
evaluating limitations and exceptions to the scope of copyright).
212. See supra note 5.
213. See infra Subsection III.B.3.
214. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 13-21. A detailed discussion of free speech theory is
beyond the scope of this Article, but others have addressed this topic. See sources cited supra note 4.
215. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 14-17.
216. Id. at 15-17.
217. Id.
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Some trademark disputes involve uses of marks in commentary about
important political matters, while others involve the communication of ideas
or information related to the markholder, its products, or society in general.
For example, Nadia Plesner sold "Simple Living" T-shirts and posters
featuring the image of a malnourished Darfurian child holding a Chihuahua
and a bag that Louis Vuitton alleges was similar to its protected "Multicolore
Trademark., 218 For this Darfur fundraiser, Plesner was allegedly trying to
evoke Paris Hilton and express the idea that the media covers meaningless
news about celebrities and handbags, and ignores what is going on in
Darfur. 219 Activist organizations use parodies of company trademarks to draw
attention to their public message about the environment (such as Greenpeace's
parody of Esso, the oil company) or health issues (such as the anti-smoking
campaign parody of the Marlboro mark). 220 The rock band Aqua used the
"Barbie" mark in its Barbie Girl song to poke fun at Barbie and the values she
represents, while Laugh it Off Promotions used the "Carling Black Label"
marks on the front of parody T-shirts that made references to the exploitation
of blacks in South Africa.221 Such third parties have a legitimate interest in
using the marks of others to express themselves, and the public has a
legitimate interest in hearing what they have to say. WTO panels and the
Appellate Body should take this into account when determining whether a
speech-protective trademark law is consistent with Article 17.
Although there is no global consensus on the scope of the free speech
right, there is likely sufficient agreement among many states who are
members of the WTO that core free speech rights should be protected against
government restriction. When they undertook obligations to protect trademark
rights in the Paris Convention and TRIPS, many members also had
international and constitutional obligations to protect free speech rights. These
states likely assumed they would continue to have discretion to protect the
right to freedom of expression and find the proper balance between trademark
and free speech rights when they agreed to minimum standards of trademark
protection and drafted the language permitting limited exceptions to
trademark rights in TRIPS Article 17. As noted by the panel in the EC-GI
dispute, the WTO members' "use of the word 'fair' [in the example in Article
218. Cease and Desist Letter from Nathalie Moulld-Berteaux, Intellectual Property Director,
Louis Vuitton Malletier, to Nadia Plesner (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.nadiaplesner.com/
Website/LouisvuittonLetter.pdf; Letter from Nadia Plesner to Nathalie MoulIl-Berteaux, Intellectual
Property Director, Louis Vuitton Malletier (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.nadiaplesner.com/
Website/AnswerToLouisVuitton.pdf; see also Art Student Nadia Plesner's Giant Louis Vuitton
Copyright Suit, N.Y. MAG., May 6, 2008, available at http://nymag.com/daily/fashion/2008/05/
art student-nadia_pelsners._gia.html (interview with Plesner and photo of the T-shirt); Mike Masnick,
Louis Vuitton Sues Darfur Fundraiser, Seems Unclear on the Concept of Trademark, TECHDIRT.COM,
Apr. 25, 2008, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080425/114126947.shtml.
219. See Art Student Nadia Plesner's Giant Louis Vuitton Copyright Suit, supra note 218;
Louis Vuitton Tried To Prevent the Nadia Plesner Lawsuit, N.Y. MAG., May 9, 2008,
http://nymag.com/daily/fashion/2008/05/louis vuitton tried to prevent.html. On her website, Plesner
claims she "decided to cease the sales of the Simple Living t-shirts in June 2008" due to the cost of
litigation and the possibility that "the case would take between 5 and 10 years in court." Nadia
Plesner.com, Biography, http://www.nadiaplesner.com/Website/about.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
220. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
221. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
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17 permitting 'fair use of descriptive terms'] and the nature of descriptive
terms illustrate a public policy concern that certain terms should be available
for use under certain conditions. 222
Thus, the "legitimate interests of third parties" in trademark disputes
must include the right to freedom of expression and, more specifically, the
right to use language claimed as a trademark to communicate information and
ideas. The person or firm using the mark has a free speech right to speak. The
audience has the right to receive the expression. Future speakers (including
competitors, critics, social activists, and other commentators) and the rest of
the general public will benefit if third parties choose to communicate in
certain truthful ways because they believe their right of free speech will be
protected against litigious trademark holders. States that protect both
trademark and free speech rights strongly, such as the United States, are more
likely to create a conflict between these two rights that will need to be
resolved. Article 17 gives states discretion to find the proper balance between
these two rights as long as the exceptions are limited and take into account the
legitimate interests of both the markholder and third parties.
D. Trademark Enforcement Obligations
When enforcing trademark rights, courts in member states have the
flexibility under Part III of TRIPS-consisting of Articles 41 through 61-to
tailor remedies in ways that protect speech.223 Article 41 requires members to
implement enforcement procedures that "permit effective action against any
act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which
constitute a deterrent to further infringements.' 224 Yet section 5 of Article 41
also provides that states are not obligated "to put in place a judicial system for
the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the
enforcement of laws in general.,
22?
TRIPS also gives members discretion in how they award specific
remedies in trademark cases, including injunctions. Trademark injunctions can
significantly harm speech interests if they prohibit the use of another's marks
to express information or ideas. Article 44 provides that "judicial authorities
shall have the authority to order a party to desist from infringement," but this
provision does not require judges to enjoin infringing use of another's
trademark in every successful trademark case. 226 For example, in cases
involving speech interests (such as parody or criticism of the markholder), a
court can refuse to grant injunctive relief to protect freedom of expression,
especially where there is no proof of actual confusion, dilution, or any other
injury. 22 Courts may also impose more speech-friendly remedies, such as
222. EC-GI, supra note 23, 1 7.683.
223. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 41-61.
224. Id. art. 41(1).
225. Id. art. 41(5).
226. Id. art. 44(1); see Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 57, at 877.
227. See LaFrance, supra note 13, at 723 (calling for a moratorium on injunctions in dilution
cases and requirement of proof of actual injury for damages); Michael Spence, Intellectual Property and
the Problem of Parody, 114 L.Q.R. 594, 617-19 (1998) (discussing the ways that U.K. judges can
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damages,228 or require use of a disclaimer, in lieu of an injunction to protect
expression.
If a nation's speech-protective remedies are challenged in the WTO,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body should defer to members in how they
implement their enforcement obligations in TRIPS Part 111.229 This was the
approach used by the panel in the recent WTO dispute brought by the United
States against China, where the United States argued that China was violating
its enforcement obligations under TRIPS. Although China did violate some of
230paeits obligations, the WTO panel held that the United States did not establish
that China's customs measures regulating disposal of confiscated products or
thresholds for criminal trademark counterfeiting and infringement were
inconsistent with the first sentence of TRIPS Article 46, Article 59, or the first
sentence of Article 61.231
Like the substantive trademark provisions in the Paris Convention and
TRIPS, the enforcement provisions in Part III of TRIPS give WTO members
latitude to protect the free flow of expression in the remedial phase of
trademark litigation.
In sum, member states can opt to protect free speech in their domestic
trademark laws, as the international obligations in the Paris Convention and
TRIPS are narrow and permit members to exclude certain signs from
trademark protection, limit the scope of trademark rights, enact limited
exceptions to trademark rights, and award speech-protective remedies. Among
other things, states can refuse to protect trademark rights in descriptive terms,
require commercial use of the mark for infringement, protect well-known
marks without enacting a strong trademark dilution law, and exempt
nontrademark uses of marks from application of the trademark laws.
Importantly, international obligations to protect trademark rights under the
Paris Convention and TRIPS are narrower than many national trademark laws
today. Thus, states with strong trademark laws may reduce protection for
rightsholders to protect speech interests and still comply with their obligations
to protect trademark rights under these agreements.
protect speech interests in trademark disputes involving parodies). Per the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in eBay v. MercExchange, courts may decline to award injunctions in intellectual property
disputes when they are not warranted by principles of equity. 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006).
228. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 45.
229. See id. art. 1(1); see infra Section III.A (discussing TRIPS Article 1(1)).
230. The WTO panel found that China's copyright law was inconsistent with its obligations
under Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, as incorporated by TRIPS Article 9(1) and TRIPS Article
41(1). See China-Measures, supra note 23, 7.139, 7.181, 7.191, 8.1(a). The panel also held the
customs regulations permitting simple removal of a counterfeit mark when products are auctioned were
inconsistent with the fourth sentence of TRIPS Article 46 and Article 59. Id. 1 7.394, 7.395(c),
8.1 (b)(iii).
231. Id. 7.395(b), 7.669, 7.681, 8.1(b)(ii), 8.1(c). For a summary of this case, see Leah Chan
Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese Trademark Law, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REv. 53, 97-103 (2008).
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III. THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION FOR WTO
DISPUTES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS To
PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND FREE SPEECH
If a WTO member elects to adopt more speech-protective trademark
laws and thereby reduce the rights of markholders within its borders, it may
have to defend this decision in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. This
Part considers the general principles of treaty interpretation that are relevant
when WTO panels and the Appellate Body determine the meaning of the
language in TRIPS and the trademark provisions of the Paris Convention
incorporated into TRIPS. As discussed below, Articles 1(1), 7, and 8 of
TRIPS specifically provide that members have flexibility in implementing
their intellectual property obligations, and may enact laws that balance
intellectual property rights with other public interests. Furthermore, the WTO
Agreement says that WTO panels and the Appellate Body must use the
customary rules of treaty interpretation and, among other things, consider
relevant international laws applicable to the parties-which would include
human rights treaties recognizing the right to freedom of expression-when
interpreting the members' obligations under the covered agreements. Past
scholarship has primarily focused on the proper interpretation of TRIPS in the
context of patent and copyright disputes;232 this Article evaluates these rules
of treaty interpretation in the trademark context. This Part concludes by
arguing that WTO jurists should narrowly interpret ambiguous obligations to
protect trademarks in the covered agreements, broadly interpret the language
in TRIPS Article 17 where states are protecting free speech interests, and
thereby defer to states in how they implement their obligations to protect
trademarks and free speech. This will protect trademark rights expressly set
forth in the agreements, the speech interests of third parties, and state
sovereignty.
A. Provisions in TRIPS Relevant to Its Interpretation
Articles 1(1), 7, and 8 of TRIPS give states some flexibility to protect
speech interests in their trademark laws, but the limitations on trademark
rights must not be inconsistent with express terms of TRIPS.233 TRIPS Article
1(1), which is entitled "Nature and Scope of Obligations," expressly gives
WTO members the ability "to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
,234
and practice." As noted by Daniel Gervais, this provision recognizes "the
flexibility of countries implementing TRIPS vis-A-vis their legal systems and
,,235
practices. States may "develop their own law and policies within the
framework established by the Agreement."
236
232. See supra note 57.
233. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in IP&IT,
supra note 1, at 3, 14.
234. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
235. GERVAIS,supra note 1, at 164.
236. Id. at 165-66.
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WTO panels and the Appellate Body must interpret TRIPS in light of
the objectives and purpose expressed in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.23 Like
Article 1(1), TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 contain language that suggests WTO
jurists should defer to states attempting to find the proper balance between
conflicting international obligations to protect trademark and free speech
rights. Article 7, entitled "Objectives," provides that:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.
238
Third parties who "use" the marks of others without authorization may not be
"users of technological knowledge" of the markholders, but the rest of the
language in Article 7 suggests that states "should" consider the general "social
and economic welfare" and "balance" trademark rights and obligations with
other relevant rights and obligations when implementing the international
trademark laws.
Protection of trademark rights is only "conducive to social and economic
welfare" if national trademark laws do not unreasonably restrict the free flow
of information and ideas, including commercial expression. If states prohibit
all uses of marks without the markholder's consent, this will harm free speech
values and hinder competition. The public and competitors should be free to
use marks without authorization to refer to the markholder (such as in news
reporting or comparative advertising), describe their own goods or services,
and otherwise engage in expression protected by the right to freedom of
expression. Allowing such expressive uses of marks can ensure a vibrant
marketplace of ideas and increase competition, which will benefit both social
and economic welfare. WTO panels and the Appellate Body should "balance"
trademark and free speech rights when they interpret the members' trademark
obligations in the covered agreements and consider the competing legitimate
interests of the markholder and third parties as required by the language in
TRIPS Article 17.
Furthermore, as long as national laws are consistent with TRIPS, Article
8 states that the "Principles" of TRIPS include the ability of members to
"adopt measures necessary ... to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
237. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 7, 8; World Trade Org. [WTO], Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, 5(a), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) ("In applying the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision in the TRIPS Agreement
shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles."); Canada-Patent Protection, supra note 185, 7.26 ("Both the goals and
the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be bome in mind when [interpreting the scope
of provisions of the TRIPS Agreement allowing limitations on rights (in that case, Article 30)] as well as
those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its object and purposes."); see infra
Subsection II1.B. I.
238. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7.
239. Cf. CORREA, supra note 1, at 93 (noting that the use of the term "should" in Article 7
"indicates that these provisions are to be systematically applied in the implementation and interpretation
of the Agreement"); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Proportionality and Balancing Within the Objectives
for Intellectual Property Protection, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 161, 173-93 (noting that several sets of
competing interests need to be balanced).
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importance to their socio-economic and technological development" and
"prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort
to practices which unreasonably restrain trade. According to Correa, this
provision gives states discretion to both define the public interest and use it in
various ways to limit intellectual property rights. 241 Of course, WTO members
must be careful not to adopt a completely unreasonable or dubious position
about what is in their nation's public interest and thereby effectively eliminate
the binding obligations in TRIPS. Yet Article 8 permits states to adopt certain
laws necessary to promote the public interest and increase competition, and
therefore requires WTO jurists to interpret and apply TRIPS "in light of
human rights laws. 242 As discussed later, international law's recognition of
the principle of freedom of expression is relevant when WTO panels and the
Appellate Body interpret the members' obligations under the trademark
provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS, and thus it should be
recognized as a valid "public interest" that states can consider under Article 8
of TRIPS.
B. The Customary Rules of Treaty Interpretation
In the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding), the WTO members
specifically agreed that customary rules of treaty interpretation should be used
to clarify the meaning of the WTO Agreement provisions. 243 The Dispute
Settlement Understanding, which is Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement, sets
forth rules and procedures that "apply to disputes brought pursuant to the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions" of the covered agreements,
including TRIPS. 244 According to Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, "[t]he Members recognize that the [dispute settlement system]
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of the Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law., 2 4 5 Thus, TRIPS, like other WTO Agreements, "is not to be read in
clinical isolation from public international law."246
The customary rules of public international law relating to treaty
interpretation are set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on
240. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 8.
241. COPREA, supra note 1, at 105 ("[Tlhe definition of what constitutes the 'public interest'
rests with the concerned Member. It is clearly a domestic issue. Members cannot challenge what 'public
interest' is in accordance with the views of a particular Member .... It may be deemed to encompass
any matter that affects the public.").
242. Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and
Cooperating, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 133, 140; see CORREA, supra note 1, at 100-01.
243. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 22, art. 3(2).
244. Id. art. 1(1).
245. Id. art. 3(2).
246. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 43, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US-Standardsfor Reformulated Gasoline].
WTO jurists have applied this principle when they "relied on the case law of other international
tribunals, namely the International Court of Justice, The European Court of Human Rights cases and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in interpreting the provisions of the WTO Agreement."
GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 511.
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the Law of Treaties. 247 The "General Rule of Interpretation" is set forth in
Article 31, while "Supplementary Means of Interpretation" are discussed in
Article 32.248 The relevant provisions of Article 31 provide that a treaty must
be interpreted in accordance with: (1) the ordinary meaning of its terms and its
context, objective, and purpose; (2) any subsequent practices or agreements
relating to the interpretation of the treaty; and (3) any relevant rules of public
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 24
9
1. The Ordinary Meaning of the Treaty Terms and the Treaty's
Context, Objective, and Purpose
Vienna Convention Article 3 1(1) provides that treaty provisions must be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its objective and
purpose.,,250 As noted by Gervais, in past decisions WTO jurists have focused
on the dictionary meaning of terms; they likely use "the normal meaning of
words" to "avoid broadening or indirectly renegotiating the scope of WTO
agreements, which may result in findings of concessions not 'bargained
for."'' 251 The "context" of a treaty includes the text, preamble, annexes, and
other agreements relating to the treaty between the parties made in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty.252 The object and purpose of TRIPS may be
found in the substantive provisions in the agreement, 253 as well as the
"Objectives" and "Principles" provisions of TRIPS-Articles 7 and 8.254
2. Subsequent Agreements Between the Parties Regarding the
Interpretation of the Treaty and Subsequent Practices
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention provides additional guidance
for WTO jurists interpreting TRIPS: "There shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
247. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For applications of these
Vienna Convention rules, see US-Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, 15-16, supra note 246; and
EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.605.
248. If the meaning of the text is ambiguous or would lead to manifestly absurd or
unreasonable results, the treaty interpreter can resort "to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion." Vienna
Convention, supra note 247, art. 32.
249. Id. art. 31.
250. Id. art. 31(1).
251. GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 239; Mavroidis, supra note 172, at 446.
252. Vienna Convention, supra note 247, art. 31(2). Among other things, the TRIPS preamble
"[r]ecogniz[es] the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of
intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives." TRIPS, supra note 1,
pmbl. (emphasis removed). This text "confirm[s] the need for achieving a balance, or, perhaps more
accurately, the need to arrive at a series of equilibriums: .. .between the private rights of intellectual
property owners and cases where the public interest may trump some aspects of the protection of
intellectual property ...." GERVAIS, supra note 1, at 158.
253. EC--GI, supra note 23, 7.620.
254. See supra note 237.
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provisions ... ." 255 In the trademark context, there are no subsequent
agreements between all of the WTO members regarding interpretation of the
trademark provisions of TRIPS or the relevant Paris Convention provisions.
Moreover, as discussed in Subsection II.B.3, WTO jurists should not consult
the bilateral free trade agreements and the nonbinding Joint Recommendation
relating to well-known marks referenced in those agreements when
interpreting the obligations set forth in TRIPS Article 16(3), as the bilateral
agreements are between a small subset of the parties, and some WTO
members have objected to the Joint Recommendation's interpretation of
Article 16(3).256
Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(b) permits WTO panels and the
Appellate Body interpreting the agreements to also take into account "any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 257 The practice must be
"concordant, common, and consistent" to qualify, though there is
disagreement on how many states must participate for it to result in an
"agreement of the parties. 2 58 If national practice evolves toward a clear
international consensus on higher or lower standards of intellectual property
protection, WTO jurists may rely on this consensus and use it to interpret or
evaluate the global minimum baseline of protection. 259 Importantly, WTO
rulings "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements" per Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, and thus these subsequent practices and agreements may not
be used to justify judicial lawmaking by WTO panels and the Appellate
Body. 260 For this reason, WTO jurists often primarily rely on what they
understand to be the ordinary meaning of the terms and focus less on state
practice and subsequent agreements.2 6'
3. International Law Recognizing a Right to Freedom of
Expression
Per Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c), WTO jurists should also take
into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties" when determining a WTO member's international
262
obligations to protect trademarks under the Paris Convention and TRIPS.
This would include treaties or principles of customary international law that
require protection of the right to freedom of expression. As noted by Neil
Netanel, Article 31(3)(c) requires a WTO panel or the Appellate Body to
"take account of any possible conflict between a maximalist interpretation of
255. Vienna Convention, supra note 247, art. 31(3)(a).
256. See supra Subsection II.B.3.
257. Vienna Convention, supra note 247, art. 3](3)(b).
258. US-Section 110(5), supra note 167, 6.55 n.66; Heifer, supra note 57, at 426-31 & nn.
310-11; Mavroidis, supra note 172, at 453-54.
259. Helfer, supra note 57, at 422-23, 426.
260. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 22, art. 3(2); Heifer, supra note 57, at 426-
31.
261. Mavroidis, supra note 172, at 446.
262. Vienna Convention, supra note 247, art. 31(3)(c).
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,,263TRIPS and international law regarding freedom of expression. Netanel
persuasively argues that "international law regarding freedom of expression
may require a WTO dispute panel to interpret broadly the scope of permissible
limitations under TRIPS where such limitations are designed to support the
free flow of information, robust debate, and other free speech interests." 264
Although Netanel's focus is on the potential conflict between copyright and
freedom of expression, his arguments are also pertinent to disputes where
WTO jurists evaluate international obligations to protect trademark rights.
International law recognizing a free speech right may be found in
treaties and, according to some commentators, in customary international law.
One such treaty is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
26 266(ICCPR),265 a treaty with 165 parties. Per Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, "the
right to freedom of expression ... shall include the freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice. 26 7 Regional treaties, such as the European Convention on Human
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, also recognize a free
speech right.268
Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
provides in Article 19 that "[e]veryone has a right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers." 269 Although the UDHR is not a treaty and does not
impose binding obligations, some commentators have argued the principles in
the UDHR have become part of customary international law and are binding
on all states.270 Christophe Geiger argues the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is a "relevant rule" of international law under Vienna Convention
Article 31(3)(c) and thus requires WTO jurists to consider free speech
interests when interpreting TRIPS.2 7'
In the ICCPR, the right to freedom of expression is subject to some
restrictions which allow states to prohibit certain types of speech, as this right
263. Netanel, supra note 57, at 475.
264. Id.; see id. at 475-90.
265. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
266. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=fND&mtdsgno=fV-4&chapter=4&ang=en
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
267. ICCPR, supra note 265, art. 19(2).
268. American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
269. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. For a discussion of the relevance
of the UDHR in the context of copyright law, see, for example, Paul L.C. Torremans, Copyright (and
Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 195, 199-204.
270. E.g., Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property
Protection, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861, 863 (2002); see Christophe Geiger, The Constitutional Dimension of
Intellectual Property, in IP&HR, supra note 6, at 101, 113 & n. 59 ("[M]any authors consider that the
declaration exerts a binding effect as customary international law.").
271. Geiger, supra note 270, at 119 n.87.
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"carries with it special duties and responsibilities." '272 ICCPR Article 19(3)
provides the free speech right may "be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary," including
restrictions "[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others. 273 Assuming
this language covers trademark and other intellectual property "rights," states
can only restrict expression to protect such rights if the restrictions are (1) set
forth in the "law" and (2) "necessary."' 27 Trademark laws that restrict
commercial speech are more likely to satisfy this standard.275
States may determine that they are required by international free speech
laws to exempt from trademark liability certain uses of marks, such as
noncommercial or nontrademark uses of marks, to protect speech interests.
They may find "wiggle room" to enact certain exceptions to trademark rights
in the "using in the course of trade" language of TRIPS Article 16(1) or the
language of Article 17. If states protect free speech rights in this way, WTO
panels and the Appellate Body should interpret ambiguous international
obligations to protect trademarks narrowly and TRIPS Article 17 broadly to
avoid an actual or potential conflict with international obligations to protect
276the right to freedom of expression.
Of course, the membership of these human rights treaties is not identical
to the membership of the WTO and Paris Convention, and thus this
international law may not be relevant for all WTO members involved in WTO
disputes. As of this writing, there are 153 members of the WTO, 277 173
contracting parties of the Paris Convention, 278 and 165 states who are parties
279to the ICCPR. Some WTO members are not bound by the obligations in the
ICCPR. An example is the twin island state of Antigua and Barbuda; it is a
member/party of the WTO and Paris Convention, but not the ICCPR. While
the membership is not identical, most states are parties to all three treaties.
Thus, taking into account the right to freedom of expression when interpreting
272. ICCPR, supra note 265, art. 19(3).
273. Id. The European Convention on Human Rights contains a similar provision. European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 268, art. 10(2).
274. ICCPR, supra note 265, art. 19(3). Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights similarly provides that restrictions on speech must be: (1) "prescribed by law"; and
(2) "necessary in a democratic society." European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 268, art.
10(2).
275. See sources cited infra notes 316-317 (discussing the standards for restricting commercial
speech in the United States and the European Union).
276. Cf. Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, Enough Is Enough-The Notion of
Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection 23 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual
Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper No. 09-01, 2008), http://ssm.comabstract=-1326429
("Generally speaking, any treaty must be applied with a presumption in favour of continuity and against
conflict in the sense that all pre-existing international rules continue to apply unless there is clear
evidence that the parties to the treaty wished to depart from a specific pre-existing rule."); see also Panel
Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 1 7.96, WTIDS163/R (May 1, 2000)
("lintemational law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not 'contract out' from
it.").
277. World Trade Organization, supra note 154. This number accounts for ninety-seven
percent of world trade. World Trade Organization, The WTO in Brief, http://www.wto.org/englishl
thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). There are also thirty observer
governments who are negotiating membership. Id.
278. World Intellectual Prop. Org., Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention, http://www.
wipo.int/treaties/enShowResults.jsp?treatyid=2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
279. United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 266.
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the treaty terms is not as troublesome as considering the subsequent bilateral
agreements between states that adopt the expansive interpretation of TRIPS
Article 16(3) in the Joint Recommendation. 280 Moreover, if customary
international law does recognize the right to freedom of expression, then it
will be easier to conclude that this right is "relevant" when interpreting the
trademark obligations of all members in disputes before the WTO.
Unfortunately, the broad language of the ICCPR and other human rights
treaties may not provide much guidance on how to resolve conflicts between
trademark and free speech rights. At a minimum, these treaties suggest that
WTO jurists should avoid a maximalist interpretation of ambiguous trademark
obligations that would conflict with free speech values. Importantly, taking
into account the right to freedom of expression when interpreting the
trademark provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS will not require
stronger protection of trademark rights beyond the express terms of the
agreements. (This is not the case if WTO jurists consult the bilateral
agreements that incorporate the Joint Recommendation and find them to be
determinative on the meaning of TRIPS Article 16(3).) For all of these
reasons, WTO panels and the Appellate Body should consider international
obligations to protect free speech rights when they interpret the trademark
provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS.
C. WTO Panels and the Appellate Body Should Use a Narrow and
Deferential Interpretation of Ambiguous International Trademark
Obligations
As discussed in Part II, the terms "using in the course of trade" and
"likelihood of confusion" in TRIPS Article 16(1) are ambiguous in certain
respects. Moreover, the scope of protection for well-known marks in Paris
Convention Article 6bis and TRIPS Article 16(3), the permitted limitations
under TRIPS Article 17, and the remedies required under TRIPS Part III are
not entirely clear from the text of the agreements. When interpreting the WTO
members' obligations under the Paris Convention and TRIPS, this Article
argues that WTO panels and the Appellate Body should use a narrow
interpretation of vague international obligations to protect and enforce
trademark rights, broadly interpret TRIPS Article 17 where states are
restricting trademark rights to protect free speech interests, and thereby defer
to states attempting to resolve any conflicts between trademark and free
speech rights.28 At the same time, WTO jurists should hold states to clear
obligations in the international agreements, as they would not be preserving
the "rights and obligations" of members under TRIPS or making an "objective
assessment" of the matter if they granted excessive deference to states.
280. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
281. Cf Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 512-18 (2000) (discussing the problems with public
international lawmaking and concluding "that WTO panels should not actively develop international
standards beyond those clearly presented in the TRIPS text"); Heifer, supra note 57, at 410-36 (using the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to propose a similar approach in the international
copyright law area that is more deferential to national legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies).
282. Heifer, supra note 57, at 411-12 (citing Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 22,
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WTO jurists should also not engage in judicial activism when
interpreting ambiguous obligations to protect trademarks and thereby increase
(or decrease) the scope of trademark obligations explicitly required by the
Paris Convention or TRIPS.28 3 Examples would be a WTO ruling that states
must protect trademarks against all unauthorized nontrademark uses of marks
under the "using in the course of trade" language and not permit exemptions
for such uses under TRIPS Article 17; that "likelihood of confusion" refers to
any type of confusion, not just source confusion; that WTO members must
enact strong trademark dilution laws similar to the U.S. federal dilution
statute; or that WTO members are required to exempt noncommercial or
nontrademark uses of marks from trademark liability. There are no such
mandatory rules in the text of these international agreements, and requiring
states to enact such rules without their clear consent will harm sovereign
interests and severely hamper the ability of states to balance trademark and
free speech rights in ways unique to their domestic legal systems and cultures.
Members have the option to implement such rules, but not an obligation.
Commentators note there are complaints about alleged "judicial
activism" in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 284 WTO jurists sometimes
engage in judicial lawmaking by clarifying ambiguities and filling gaps in the
WTO Agreement when interpreting it.285 Other times, they give a precise and
narrow meaning to language that was intentionally left vague by the WTO
members, possibly because states could not agree on more specific language
286
or because they wanted to permit a range of national practices. Article 3(2)
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that WTO jurists can clarify
the provisions of the WTO-covered agreements, but imposing one meaning on
ambiguous language may contradict the intent of the members, create new
287
rights or obligations, and upset the balance of rights and responsibilities.
While some intellectual property scholars argue that WTO panels and
the Appellate Body should not employ a "passivist" interpretation of the
international agreements "by stalling progress or by shying away from areas
of political contention," 28 8 there are many reasons why WTO jurists should
avoid an "activist" interpretive philosophy when evaluating complaints under
the trademark provisions of the Paris Convention or TRIPS. First, judicial
lawmaking is explicitly prohibited under the WTO Agreement. The WTO
members clearly stated in Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding that "[r]ecommendations and rulings . . . cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.',
289
arts. 3(2), 11).
283. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 281, at 503-18 (explaining why WTO jurists should
reject an activist interpretive philosophy in resolving WTO disputes).
284. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 248, 257 (2004).
285. Id. at 248, 252.
286. Id. at 252-54.
287. Id. at 259-61.
288. E.g., Weckstrom, supra note 93, at 171 (arguing that WTO panels "should interpret the
TRIPS Agreement and its provisions in the legal framework and practical context in which they
operate").
289. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 22, art. 3(2); see Dinwoodie, supra note
281, at 503.
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WTO members therefore did not agree to allow WTO panels or the Appellate
Body to broaden the scope of the agreements by creating new obligations
regarding trademark or free speech rights not contemplated by the parties.
Both WTO panels and the Appellate Body have noted that "[t]he fundamental
rule of treaty interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret
the words actually used by the agreement under examination, not words the
interpreter may feel should have been used.
290
Second, many scholars believe that states may be bound in international
law only through "consent, strictly construed., 291 They adopt the principle of
in dubio mitius, which ordains that "where there are two plausible approaches
to the interpretation of a treaty provision, the treaty interpreter adopt the
interpretation that is less restrictive of the sovereignty of the State or States
,,292
undertaking the obligation in question. A deferential interpretive method
will ensure that members are not bound unless they clearly consented to a
particular obligation to protect trademark or free speech rights. WTO panels
and the Appellate Body have used such a deferential approach in past
intellectual property disputes. 293 They should continue to do this rather than
adopt a particular solution to the conflict between trademark and free speech
rights.
Third, TRIPS Article 1(1) expressly gives WTO members the ability "to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of [the
TRIPS] Agreement within their own legal system and practice." 294 Dinwoodie
and Dreyfuss convincingly argue this language supports using a "neo-
federalist" approach in interpretation of the text of TRIPS, whereby WTO
jurists read ambiguous obligations narrowly and defer to states in their
implementation of TRIPS as long as the members do not derogate from
particular commitments to protect intellectual property rights under the
covered agreements. 295 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss note "[p]ermitting some
diversity of approach allows nation states to act as laboratories in the
development of international rules; affording space for the self-determination
of sovereign states encourages voluntary and ultimately more effective
compliance with international norms." 296 As it is difficult to amend a
290. E.g., EC-GI, supra note 23, 7.624 (quoting Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 181, WT/DS26/AB/R (Aug. 18, 1997)).
291. Steinberg, supra note 284, at 258.
292. Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in
Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 497 (2000).
293. See, e.g., EC-GI, supra note 23; US-Section 211, supra note 23; US-Section 110(5),
supra note 167; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 765 (2001) (noting that the US-
Section 110(5) "report contains several passages apparently exhibiting substantial deference to national
autonomy").
294. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1(1); see also Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 59, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997)
(applying TRIPS Article 1(1)); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 446 (2000).
295. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431 (2004); Dinwoodie &
Dreyfuss, supra note 57, at 880-81.
296. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 57, at 883; see Dinwoodie, supra note 293, at 747;
Dinwoodie, supra note 281, at 514-15; cf. LADAS, supra note 1, at 9-16 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of harmonization and uniformity of industrial property law).
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multilateral treaty, 297 it is extremely troublesome if a WTO panel or the
Appellate Body adopts an incorrect interpretation of the trademark provisions
of the Paris Convention or TRIPS that eliminates the flexibility states
currently have to adopt different speech-protective trademark laws in response
to changes in technology, society, and national trademark and free speech
jurisprudence.
A fourth, independent reason to reject an activist interpretive approach
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is because these judicial proceedings
are not the best source of new international rules. Proceedings are often
confidential and not procedurally transparent.298 As noted by Dinwoodie, "the
WTO dispute settlement process is, in terms of representational legitimacy, far
removed and insulated from appropriate democratic pressures (both by
inherent institutional place and by current rules on transparency of
process).,,299 A WTO panel or the Appellate Body might not have sufficient
information to adopt the perfect solution (if one exists) to a particular conflict
between trademark and free speech rights. Even more problematic, "the WTO
dispute resolution process will generate rules of international effect that are
immediately, upon first articulation, embedded as norms of a fundamental,
higher level with preemptive effect on alternative generative mechanisms.
30 0
As it is deciding one dispute between a few states and only hearing their
evidence and arguments, it is inappropriate for one panel or the Appellate
Body to develop a new rule that then creates legitimate expectations among
other WTO members regarding their obligations under the covered
agreements.
Finally, it is important to recall that even if WTO panels and the
Appellate Body read ambiguous provisions narrowly, WTO member states
may still err on the side of protecting strong trademark rights within their
borders when trademark and free speech rights conflict. A deferential
approach to WTO members' international obligations to protect trademarks
does not require states to reduce trademark rights to protect freedom of
expression. It just gives states that option. This Article argues that countries
have the flexibility to implement speech-protective trademark laws if they
desire to protect the free flow of information in the marketplace and beyond.
In WTO dispute settlement proceedings WTO jurists should therefore
also not conclude that the ICCPR or other human rights treaties require states
to protect expression in certain ways in their national trademark laws. An
example would be a WTO ruling that states must enact a mandatory
exemption from trademark liability for uses of marks in noncommercial
expression. TRIPS Article 1(1) provides that WTO members "may, but shall
not be obliged to, implement in their domestic law more extensive protection
than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not
contravene the provisions of this Agreement."'301 Some scholars argue that
WTO panels and the Appellate Body should construe public international law
297. See Dinwoodie, supra note 281, at 501; Weckstrom, supra note 93, at 189-90.
298. See Dinwoodie, supra note 281, at 503, 505, 508.
299. Id. at 503.
300. Id.
301. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
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obligations (including the WTO-covered agreements and other relevant
international rules of law between the parties) as a whole to create a more
uniform international law, and that they can use non-WTO-covered
agreements as a source of law in WTO disputes.30 2 If "relevant" human rights
treaties can be used in this way, and these treaties are interpreted to protect
noncommercial expression from restriction, free speech advocates may argue
that extending the scope of trademark protection to noncommercial uses of
marks-uses of marks outside the course of trade--"contravene[s] the
provisions of this Agreement" and thus is not permitted under Article 1(1) of
TRIPS.
There are several problems with allowing WTO jurists to use the ICCPR
or other relevant international human rights treaties as a source of law in
WTO disputes, and thereby engage in speech-protective judicial lawmaking
when interpreting the trademark provisions of the Paris Convention or TRIPS.
First, scholars convincingly argue that "relevant rules of international law"
should only be used to aid in the interpretation of the WTO agreements, and
cannot be used as a source of law that binds the WTO members.30 3 This
approach is supported by Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. 3°4 Relevant international law should be taken into account per
the customary rules of international law in a manner similar to the U.S.
Charming Betsy rule-"interpret so as to avoid conflict where possible." 30 5 If
states want to create obligations to protect free speech values in the trademark
provisions of the Paris Convention or TRIPS, they should amend those
agreements, as discussed in Part IV.
Moreover, the free speech obligations in the human rights treaties are
broadly worded and thus do not impose specific obligations on their members
to protect certain types of speech from restriction. For example, Article 19(2)
of the ICCPR provides that "the right to freedom of expression . . . shall
include the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of
art, or through any other media of his choice." 30 6 Does this language require
states to protect all noncommercial expression from trademark restrictions?
Does it more specifically prevent states from applying trademark law to the
unauthorized use of marks in political speech, news reporting, literary and
artistic works, comparative advertising, or commercial parodies and satire
displayed on T-shirts and other merchandise sold for a profit? Article 19(3) of
the ICCPR permits states to protect trademark "rights" if the restrictions are
(1) set forth in the "law" and (2) "necessary." 30 7 Does the ICCPR therefore
302. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 470-73 (2003); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 540-52 (2001).
303. See, e.g., Mavroidis, supra note 172, at 425, 436-37; Trachtman, supra note 22, at 342-43,
347-48.
304. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 22, art. 3(2); see Mavroidis, supra note
172, at 425.
305. Trachtman, supra note 22, at 343 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479 (1998).
306. ICCPR, supra note 265, art. 19(2).
307. Id. art. 19(3).
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allow states to prevent confusing uses of marks in noncommercial speech to
impersonate markholders and generally protect the right of nonprofit
organizations to use trademarks to identify and distinguish themselves from
others? 30 8 Not only do the human rights treaties provide little guidance on
these issues, but it is not clear that trade-focused WTO dispute settlement
proceedings are the proper forum for resolving such actual or potential
conflicts between trademark and free speech rights.
Another problem is that there is currently no global consensus on the
scope of the free speech right.30 9 Many states believe in a right to free speech
about political issues, but some restrict political speech to further other
important goals. 310 For example, Canada and Germany protect the right to
freedom of expression in their constitutions but these states elevate concerns
about equality and the dignity of persons above free speech concerns.31
Moreover, Germany "prohibits political parties who wish to disestablish
democratic self-government in Germany" and thus "an entire category of core
political speech activit enjoys no protection whatsoever in the German
constitutional system." 3 2 Japan offers stronger protection for political speech,
but its right of free speech does not extend to commercial speech or erotica.
313
The free speech right is most broad in the United States where, among other
things, it encompasses political speech, scientific and academic speech,
entertainment, nonobscene pornography, commercial advertising, expression
on T-shirts, and other types of noncommercial and commercial speech.
314
The European Convention on Human Rights protects freedom of
expression, including commercial expression, 315 but as in the United States,
3 16
the government has more discretion to limit commercial expression to further
317
other important government interests. Moreover, as discussed in the
introduction to Part II, the European Court of Human Rights recently held that
trademarks are property rights for purposes of human rights analysis,318 and
308. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86 (2d
Cir. 1997).
309. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 214-22; Dinwoodie, supra note 281, at 513-14.
310. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 218-19.
311. Id. at 4, 9, 26-138.
312. Id. at 94 (citing GG [Constitution] art. 21(2)).
313. Id. at9, 139-82.
314. Id. at 12-25; see Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner,
C.J.) (stating that defendant's T-shirts advocating the legalization of marijuana "are to [the seller] what
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v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1309, 1312, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (WAL*OCAUST
and WAL-QAEDA T-shirts).
315. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 268, art. 10; Griffiths, supra note 56,
at 309, 329 (discussing the European Court of Human Rights cases that say commercial expression is
protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
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318. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 72-78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11,
2007), http://www.echr.coe.int.
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thus this right must be balanced against the free speech right. In some
trademark cases in Europe, judges have interpreted the free speech right
narrowly. For example, in Miss World Limited, the U.K. registrant of the mark
"Miss World" sought an injunction to prevent a television station from using
the title "Mr. Miss World" while broadcasting a news segment about a
transsexual beauty pageant.319 The trial judge rejected the argument that this
use of the mark was permitted by the right to freedom of expression in Section
12 of the U.K. Human Rights Act and Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, and held that "[a]bsent a sign which is really telling a
political story, making a political point or identifying some matter of public
importance, I find the idea that use of a trade mark can of itself generally
engage Article 10 of the Convention difficult."
320
As there is little agreement on the scope of the free speech right, or its
importance compared to trademark rights, it is troublesome for WTO panels
or the Appellate Body to use the international right to freedom of expression
to create binding, mandatory speech-protective trademark rules in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. Although such rules would further free speech
values, they would bind the WTO members without their consent and impinge
on their sovereignty. In the future, more WTO members may acknowledge the
potential conflict between trademark and free speech rights and decide to
pursue mandatory protection of free speech interests in national or
international trademark laws. Until then, WTO jurists should not create new
obligations on states to adopt speech-protective trademark laws. Rather than
attempt to find the proper balance between free speech and trademark rights,
WTO jurists should instead defer to states when international obligations to
protect trademark or free speech rights are ambiguous and let states resolve
any conflicts created by application of trademark laws to expression.
If states have discretion to protect free speech in their trademark laws in
a variety of ways, there will be many distinct national trademark laws. This
can increase costs for markholders who sell their products globally. Yet
harmonization of national laws is not the best solution for markholders,
competitors, or the public if the trademark laws created by WTO panels or the
Appellate Body are not good, effective laws. States were not able to agree on
one particular type of trademark regime and instead opted to require certain
minimum standards of trademark protection in the Paris Convention and
TRIPS. As there is national discord today on the proper scope of trademark
and free speech rights, it is best to let states experiment and find the best
domestic solution to the conflict between these rights before new international
trademark rules are created by WTO panels or the Appellate Body, or, as
discussed next, by the WTO members in the form of an amendment to TRIPS.
In sum, states have flexibility under TRIPS Article 1(1) on how they
implement their international trademark obligations. TRIPS Articles 7 and 8
319. Miss World Ltd. v. Channel 4 Television Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 982 (Eng.).
320. ld. 47.
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allow states to protect the public interest in free speech in their trademark laws
as long as the laws are consistent with the express terms of the Paris
Convention and TRIPS. Moreover, international law relating to the right to
freedom of expression is "relevant" when WTO panels and the Appellate
Body interpret the trademark provisions of these international agreements. In
WTO disputes involving conflicting trademark and free speech rights, WTO
panels and the Appellate Body should narrowly interpret ambiguous
trademark obligations in the Paris Convention and TRIPS, broadly construe
the permissible limitations on trademark rights in TRIPS Article 17, and
recognize that the enforcement provisions in TRIPS Part III give states
flexibility to use speech-protective remedies. This will prevent the WTO from
imposing obligations on its members without their consent, and reduce
trademark law's potential conflict with international laws and constitutional
provisions requiring protection of the right to freedom of expression.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ADDING NEW SPEECH-
PROTECTIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADEMARK AGREEMENTS
It is clear that states have the option to protect speech interests in their
trademark laws in certain ways without violating the Paris Convention and
TRIPS. One important question, however, is whether states should amend
these international agreements to explicitly protect the right to freedom of
expression. States could add provisions with permissive language (using terms
like "may") to these international documents and more clearly provide that
states have the option to protect speech interests in their domestic trademark
laws, or use mandatory language in the provisions (using terms like "shall")
and require states to protect speech in certain ways in their statutes and in
trademark disputes. 32An example of a permission provision currently in
TRIPS is Article 17, which provides: "Members may provide limited
exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of
descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate
interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties."
An example of a mandatory provision would be the emphasized
language in this revised version of TRIPS Article 17: "Members may provide
limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark provided that such
exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the
trademark and of third parties. Members shall permit the fair use of
descriptive terms otherwise protected as trademarks." Another example of a
mandatory rule would be a prohibition in TRIPS Article 15 on protecting
trademark rights in certain subject matter. For example, if the WTO members
wanted to deny trademark protection to descriptive and generic terms, Article
15 could be amended to add the following language: "Members shall refuse to
register or protect trademark rights in trademarks that consist exclusively of
descriptive or generic terms." Put another way, using language from Article
321. I appreciate the helpful comments provided by Graeme Dinwoodie on this issue, among
others.
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6quinquies(B)(2) of the Paris Convention, this mandatory rule would state:
"Members shall refuse to register or protect trademark rights in trademarks
that consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to
designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin,
of the goods, or the time of production, or have become customary in the
current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade of
the country where protection is claimed."
Some scholars argue that member states should amend TRIPS to add
mandatory provisions that require states to protect speech in their trademark
laws.322 Below, this Part considers whether states should add permissive or
mandatory provisions to the Paris Convention or TRIPS that protect the right
to freedom of expression in specific or general ways. While there may be
some advantages to such an amendment, new speech-protective provisions
may not ultimately protect expression better than the current flexible
trademark provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS.
A. Specific Exceptions to Trademark Rights
For the reasons discussed in Parts II and III, it is unnecessary to amend
the Paris Convention or TRIPS to add more speech-protective permission
provisions because states already can protect speech interests in their
trademark laws and still comply with their international trademark obligations.
Yet there may still be some advantages to such an amendment. For example,
if TRIPS Article 17 is amended to list certain noncommercial or nontrademark
uses of marks that "may" be exempted from trademark liability, this will
clarify that such exceptions are definitely permitted under Article 17. It may
encourage more states, especially those with civil law systems, to implement
these "WTO-approved" exceptions to trademark rights. As states would not be
bound to include these rules in their domestic trademark laws, however, they
may not have a sufficient incentive to change their trademark statutes to make
them more speech-protective. Permissive provisions will also not provide
states with an excuse to refuse to increase trademark rights above the
minimum obligations required by the Paris Convention and TRIPS in
subsequent bilateral or regional trade agreements.
As a permissive approach may not adequately protect speech interests,
free speech advocates may argue that states should instead amend the Paris
Convention or TRIPS to require states to impose mandatory exceptions to
trademark rights in areas of trademark law that are particularly speech-
harmful. Such limitations or exceptions to intellectual property rights have
been called "users' rights" or "substantive maxima." 323 If the rules are
mandatory, states cannot protect intellectual property rights above the levels
indicated in the agreement in statutes and court or administrative decisions.
Some scholars endorse this approach in the international copyright law area;
322. See infra Section IV.A.
323. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New Actors,
New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 205, 214 (2006).
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they propose adding specific "users' rights" to TRIPS' copyright provisions or
a new copyright treaty.
324
Recently, as part of the Intellectual Property Rights in Transition (IPT)
Project, members of a working group of the International Association for the
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP)
drafted a proposed amendment to TRIPS which includes mandatory "ceilings"
or limitations on intellectual property rights. 325 Unlike many past proposals
for creating "maximum rights" in international intellectual property law, this
document also included proposed changes to the trademark provisions of
TRIPS. Among other things (including a significant revision of Articles 7 and
8, and the addition of a new Article 8a and 8b), the 2006 IPT draft proposed
substituting the following language into TRIPS Article 17:
1. In accordance with Articles 7 to 8b, the protection conferred by a trademark shall not
extend to: (a) strictly non-commercial use[, with the possible exception of private
possession and use of counterfeit goods]; (b) use in the course of trade (i) for descriptive
purposes, like indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value,
geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or
other characteristics of goods or services; (ii) in order to provide information in
connection with sales of goods or services that are legitimately commercialised on the
market concerned; (iii) for other marketing purposes providing relevant information, in
particular comparative advertising; (iv) in a satirical or parodist manner or other modes of
use covered by rules applying to freedom of speech and/or freedom of art in the Member
concerned; provided that such use is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters. In particular, use shall be deemed inadmissible that is likely to
mislead the average consumer about the existence of a commercial link between the
holder of the trademark and a third party.
2. Members may further restrict the protection conferred by trademarks subject to the
provisions of Articles 7 to 8b, provided that this does not impair the capability of
trademarks to convey correct and reliable information as to the commercial origin of
goods or services.
3 26
According to Annette Kur, the provisions in the ATRIP working group's
IPT proposal "largely reflect what is considered already to-date as the
standard to which most countries adhere in their substantive laws." 327 She
324. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21, 27, 30, 32-33 (2004); P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an
International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions in Copyright 35-50 (Open Soc'y Inst., 2008),
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf; Ruth L. Okediji, The International
Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries
22- 23 (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 15, 2006),
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/ruth%202405.pdf. See generally Kur & Grosse Ruse-Kahn,
supra note 276 (discussing the advantages of mandatory ceilings for all the intellectual property rights
covered by TRIPS and discussing proposed revisions to the international intellectual property
agreements).
325. See Kur & Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 276, at 64-68; A. Kur, TRIPS Amendments-
Background and Explanations (2006), http://www.atrip.org/upload/files/activities/Parma2006/
Kur/20AMENDMENT.pdf (explaining the IPT proposal presented at the 2006 ATRIP Congress in
Parma, Italy that was created by a working group of ATRIP members consisting of Kur, Marianne
Levin, Niklas Bruun, Jens Schovsbo, and Fran ois Curchod).
326. INT'L ASSN FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING & RESEARCH IN INTELLECTUAL PROP.,
SYNOPSIS OF ORIGINAL VERSION AND PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT TO TRIPS 7 (2006),
http://www.atrip.org/upload/files/activities/Parma2006/Kur/ 2OSYNOPSIS.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSED
TRIPS REVISION SYNOPSIS] (alterations in original).
327. Kur, supra note 325, at 7; see PROPOSED TRIPS REVISION SYNOPSIS, supra note 326, at 2-
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argues that WTO jurists interpreting the terms of TRIPS are more likely to
consider the public interest if users' rights are codified just like intellectual
property rights. 328 Kur also says mandatory users' rights are needed because
some states have not taken advantage of the current flexibilities in TRIPS to
protect the public interest and have instead adopted laws that favor strong
intellectual property rights. 329 If TRIPS is amended to require members to
reduce the scope of patent, copyright, and trademark protection in favor of
user rights, it may be easier for developing states to resist pressure to increase
intellectual property rights and add "TRIPS-Plus" provisions during
negotiations of bilateral or regional trade agreements.33 °
In the trademark context, member states seeking to craft or revise
domestic trademark laws may ignore free speech concerns in favor of
maximum trademark rights unless particular exceptions to trademark rights
are expressly set forth in the international trademark agreements. In those
states where treaty provisions are self-executing or enacted word-for-word in
trademark statutes, or in civil law countries where judges do not develop the
law much beyond its statutory terms, including speech-protective trademark
rules in TRIPS may better protect speech interests by encouraging states to
enact users' rights in domestic legislation. Once a specific list of permitted
uses of trademarks is added to national laws, it will be easier for third parties
to predict whether they can use language claimed as a mark in certain ways in
that state and less speech will be chilled or suppressed by courts.
As more trademarks cross national boundaries today via the Internet and
global trade, mandatory speech-protective exceptions to trademark rights may
be necessary to maintain the free flow of information in all states. If states
have the flexibility to protect trademark rights at the expense of free speech
without violating their international obligations, any restrictions of expression
will also affect the speech-protective states with industries that sell and
advertise their products globally. For example, if a state protects strong
trademark rights in descriptive terms and prevents their use by competitors as
part of a brand name or in slogans or domain names, both domestic and
foreign companies will not be able to use these descriptive terms in similar
ways when they sell their own goods in stores or on the Internet to people in
that state. Consumers will not have access to full descriptive information
about products in the marketplace, which may harm competition. In addition,
foreign governments may prevent the unauthorized use on websites of marks
to communicate information or ideas, such as in comparative advertising,
criticism of the markholder or its products or services, or a good parody of a
self-important markholder. If these websites have a global audience, any
national decision to restrict expression to protect trademark rights will harm
the free speech rights of people outside that state who would normally have
access to this website.
There are also other speech-related benefits of adding mandatory
exceptions to trademark rights in international law. If less speech-protective
328. Kur, supra note 325, at 3.
329. Id.
330. Id. Many of the arguments in this paragraph are also discussed in Kur & Grosse Ruse-
Kahn, supra note 276, at 64-68.
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states agree to protect free speech in the context of trademark law to obtain the
trade-related benefits of membership in the WTO and protect users' rights in
their trademark statutes and court decisions, citizens of those states may
realize the advantages of stronger free speech rights and eventually convince
their governments to embrace the principle of freedom of expression
generally. Encouraging others throughout the world to protect free speech is a
valid goal. But it is not clear that international trademark law should serve as
the vehicle for accomplishing this goal.
Although there are some advantages to listing required exceptions to
trademark rights in TRIPS or the Paris Convention, there are also some
disadvantages. First, mandatory ceilings on trademark rights limit the
flexibility of states. A "one-size-fits-all" list of exceptions may discourage
states from balancing free speech and trademark rights in unique ways that
benefit their citizens. 33 Some rules may be unfavorable and ill-fitting in
certain domestic situations. 332 For example, Kur admits that the exclusion for
use of a mark for strictly noncommercial purposes in the draft IPT proposal to
amend TRIPS could give rise to problems in countries where private
possession and use of counterfeit goods is a crime. a3A mandatory
noncommercial use exemption could also be problematic in states that want to
protect the ability of nonprofit organizations to identify and distinguish
themselves from competitors and prevent consumer confusion about the
source of noncommercial goods, services, or activities. States have not yet
sufficiently experimented with enacting these types of speech-protective
trademark laws at a local level. Until we are more confident that certain rules
properly balance trademark and free speech rights, states should be wary
about adding specific mandatory exemptions to trademark rights to the Paris
Convention or TRIPS that bind states at an international level.
In addition, it may be difficult for states to agree on the content and
specificity of speech-protective trademark rules. Most states can likely agree
that trademark laws should not unreasonably conflict with the right to freedom
of expression, but there will be much disagreement when they discuss the
details. Should the members agree to exempt all noncommercial or
nontrademark uses of marks from trademark liability, or include more specific
exemptions for use of a mark in the content of political speech, news
reporting, and other noncommercial expression? Will they permit
unauthorized use of a competitor's mark in comparative advertising,
commercial parody and satire, and other commercial expression? Can states
agree on whether third parties can use another's marks in a message displayed
on the front of T-shirts and other expressive merchandise, in a domain name
linked to a website, or in a keyword that triggers an advertisement on an
Internet search engine? States may not be able to achieve consensus today on
some of these issues.
331. See Kur & Gross Ruse-Kahn, supra note 276, at 28-29.
332. Kur, supra note 325, at 6.
333. Id. at 19. That is why proposed TRIPS Article 17(l)(a)'s "strictly non-commercial use"
exception includes the following language: "[, with the possible exception of private possession and use
of counterfeit goods]." Id. (alterations in original); PROPOSED TRIPS REVISiON SYNOPsIS, supra note
326, at 7.
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Moreover, unless the international trademark agreement clearly provides
that members still have discretion to implement unlisted exceptions to
trademark rights, states may incorrectly believe they no longer have the
flexibility to exempt from trademark liability uses of a mark that are not listed
in the agreement. If specific rules are added, it is critical to retain the language
in TRIPS Article 17 or a similar catch-all provision that allows other limited
exceptions to trademark rights.334 In WTO disputes, this will discourage WTO
panels and the Appellate Body from focusing just on the specific listed
exceptions. It will also permit states to adapt domestic trademark laws to
social, technological, and legal changes. Marks may be used without
authorization in new and unforeseen ways-when TRIPS was drafted, no one
knew that Google and other Internet service providers would use marks
without authorization within keywords to trigger advertisements on Internet
search engines. Such trademark uses may further free speech interests without
causing confusion or other significant social harms; allowing comparative
advertising can increase the free flow of commercial information about less
costly or higher quality alternatives to the leading brand.
It is true that increasing certainty regarding international obligations to
protect trademark rights and limitations on those rights can protect free speech
values. States may err on the side of more trademark protection-and less free
speech protection-if they are uncertain about their obligations and want to
avoid an international trademark dispute. Yet predictability is not as critical in
the international realm as it is in national trademark laws because international
law regulates states, not individual speakers. In international trademark
disputes before the WTO, the parties to the dispute are states, not persons or
entities trying to decide whether a national trademark law allows them to use a
word claimed as a mark in a particular way. During WTO dispute settlement
proceedings, the issue would be whether a state is complying with its
international trademark obligations when it reduces trademark rights to protect
free expression. Unlike in national trademark disputes, the speakers-the
individuals or entities using language claimed as a mark-will not be directly
penalized or enjoined in WTO disputes. For these reasons, certainty for states
may not be as important for free speech purposes as flexibility for states at the
international level.
Furthermore, national trademark rules will only be more speech-
protective if the rules in international trademark agreements ultimately require
states to provide the same or more protection for free speech in their
trademark laws. Any international consensus that could be reached at this
point may not adequately protect speech interests. Harmonization does not
further free speech goals if the harmonized trademark laws do not adequately
protect speech. We may end up with a global free speech policy in trademark
law that is less speech-protective because it reflects compromises among
states. The scholarly literature on this topic is fairly new and states may not be
fully aware of the scope of this conflict between trademark and free speech
334. See Geiger, supra note 270, at 123-24. The ATRIP working group's IPT proposal
included such a provision in the second paragraph of its revised version of Article 17. PROPOSED TRIPS
REVISION SYNopsis, supra note 326, at 7.
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rights. If the new international standard is lower than some current national
trademark laws, there is always a risk that those states will reduce users' rights
to that lower, harmonized standard.335
Finally, even if mandatory ceilings on trademark rights are added to
TRIPS, these new rules may not significantly increase national protection of
free speech rights. States will likely only file complaints in the WTO to
protect users' rights if there are also trade advantages; WTO dispute
settlement proceedings will rarely be initiated by states solely for altruistic
reasons. 336 TRIPS does not have direct effect in many countries, so states
would need to revise their laws to incorporate these ceilings on trademark
rights.337 If other states are unlikely to complain about a failure to adopt
mandatory users' rights, WTO members have less of an incentive to
implement these provisions in their domestic laws.
As the costs of amendment appear to outweigh the benefits, this Article
concludes that member states should not amend the Paris Convention or
TRIPS at this time to add specific mandatory exceptions to trademark rights.
They should instead pursue speech-protective reforms of trademark law at the
national level. Rigid international rules reflect global norms at a specific point
in time and do not give members flexibility to adapt their national laws to
changed circumstances. Multilateral treaties can be amended, but not as easily
as national laws. Speech may be better protected globally if countries retain
control to decide the proper balance of trademark and free speech rights. Of
course, member states should also refrain from amending the Paris
Convention or TRIPS to reduce the flexibility of states to protect speech
interests in domestic trademark laws.
B. A General Requirement That Members Protect the Right to
Freedom of Expression in National Trademark Laws
States could also amend the Paris Convention or TRIPS to explicitly
protect free speech interests in a more general way. They could enact a
provision that permits or requires states to protect "the right to freedom of
expression" when implementing their obligations under the Paris Convention
and TRIPS.338 For example, mandatory language such as "Members shall
protect the right to freedom of expression when implementing the provisions
of this Agreement" could be added to Articles 1(1), 7, or 8 of TRIPS, or
similar trademark-specific language could be added to the end of Article 17.
(A permissive provision would substitute "may" for "shall.")
If TRIPS is amended to explicitly recognize the right to freedom of
expression, this would discourage states or markholders from arguing that
TRIPS' silence on this issue means that trademark rights automatically trump
free speech rights. It may also discourage WTO panels and the Appellate
335. Kur, supra note 325, at 6.
336. Id. at 4-5.
337. Id. at 5-6.
338. Cf Geiger, supra note 270, at 118 ("It would be worth considering including a reference
to the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] in the TRIPS Agreement, so that the Declaration could
serve as a guideline for its interpretation.").
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Body from adopting a maximalist interpretation of ambiguous international
trademark obligations and encourage them to explicitly balance trademark and
free speech rights in WTO reports. 3  Such a provision would continue to give
WTO members discretion to protect speech in their trademark laws but would
not lock states into complying with inflexible rules that reflect international
norms at a specific point in time. Moreover, this standards-based approach is
consistent with other provisions in TRIPS, such as TRIPS Articles 13, 17, and
30, which contain broad language rather than a specific list of permitted
exceptions.
340
Yet because such an amendment lacks specificity and does not provide
guidance to member states on how to protect speech interests in their domestic
trademark laws, it may not significantly increase protection of free speech
rights. Here, too, the costs of amendment seem to outweigh the benefits. Some
member states may claim it is not worth the effort to amend TRIPS or the
Paris Convention-a daunting task-just to add a vague requirement that
members "shall" or "may" protect the right to freedom of expression when
implementing their international trademark obligations. As discussed in Parts
II and III, the current trademark provisions are sufficiently flexible to allow
states to limit trademark rights to protect free speech values and the
international right of freedom of expression is already relevant when WTO
jurists interpret these provisions. Without an amendment requiring exemptions
for specific types of trademark uses, it will be difficult to argue that states are
clearly violating a mandatory international obligation to protect the right to
freedom of expression when they protect trademark rights at the expense of
free speech.34 A vague provision requiring or allowing protection of the right
to freedom of expression in national trademark laws will not be very effective
in encouraging some less-speech-protective countries, such as China or Cuba,
to actually adopt more speech-protective trademark laws. Human rights
advocates may also argue that efforts to amend TRIPS should be focused on
other more important issues, such as public health exceptions in international
patent law, or users' rights in international copyright law.
For all of these reasons, member states need not, and should not, attempt
to revise the Paris Convention or TRIPS today to more explicitly protect the
ight to freedom of expression. As noted above, they will better protect free
speech values by pursuing reform of trademark laws at the national level.
Those states and commentators that recognize the potential conflict between
trademark and free speech rights may eventually change international norms
by educating others about this problem and ultimately pave the way for
speech-protective amendments to international trademark laws sometime in
the future.
339. Cf Kur & Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 276, at 51 (noting that flexible ceilings on 1P
rights may cause policymakers to consider the issues more thoroughly, and have the value of not taking
away flexibilities and policy space necessary to tailor an IP regime to domestic needs).
340. See Canada-Patent Protection, supra note 185, 7.70. While early drafts of TRIPS
Article 30 included specific exemptions for "private use, scientific use, prior use, a traditional exception
for pharmacists and the like," the WTO panel noted that an "illustrative list approach was abandoned in
favour of a more general authorization following the outlines of the present Article 30." Id.
341. Cf KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 5.
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V. CONCLUSION
In WTO disputes involving conflicting trademark and free speech rights,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body should recognize the inherent
flexibilities in the trademark provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS to
protect the right to freedom of expression. Member states may protect speech
interests by excluding certain signs from protectable trademark subject matter,
narrowly defining the rights conferred by a trademark, and allowing certain
exceptions to trademark rights. The enforcement provisions of TRIPS also
permit national courts to tailor trademark remedies to protect expression. The
international trademark obligations set forth in the agreements are narrower
than many national trademark laws today, so members can scale back strong
national trademark rights to protect speech without violating the Paris
Convention or TRIPS.
To better protect speech interests in international trademark law,
member states could amend the Paris Convention or TRIPS to explicitly
require states to protect "the right to freedom of expression" when
implementing their trademark obligations. States could also add specific
permissive or mandatory exemptions for certain uses of a mark to the
international trademark laws. This Article concludes that states should instead
adopt speech-friendly trademark laws at the national level, evaluate whether
these domestic laws properly balance trademark and free speech rights, and
not pursue international reform until more states recognize that certain
trademark laws can harm the free flow of information and ideas.

